0956-B-03 PREX 7.10: FBIS-EAS-92-187

FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

Daily Report

East Asia

FBIS-EAS-92-187
Friday
25 September 1992

JB 99-017113

COMPLETED

Daily Report
East Asia

FBIS-EAS-92-187 *25 September 1992*

CONTENTS

NOTICE TO READERS: An • indicates material not disseminated in electronic form.

INTER-ASIAN AFFAIRS

ASEAN Parliamentarians Hold General Assembly 1
Favor Formation of Free Trade Area *[ANTARA]* 1
Discuss Human Rights *[ANTARA]* 1

NORTHEAST ASIA

Japan

PRC Vice Premier Comments on Emperor's Visit *[KYODO]* 2
Foreign Minister Watanbe in New York 2
Urges African Nations To Attend Conference *[KYODO]* 2
Urges Rio Group To Back Peru's Election Plan *[KYODO]* 2
Spokesman Welcomes New Thai Prime Minister *[KYODO]* 3
Kanemaru Agrees To Accept Summary Indictment *[KYODO]* 3
Sagawa Kyubin Head Said Influenced Cabinet Posts *[KYODO]* 4
Report Indicates Economy Continuing To Slow *[KYODO]* 4
MITI Expects Worst in Late Autumn *[KYODO]* 5
Foreign Share of Microchip Market Rises *[KYODO]* 5

North Korea

Reports of Riots, Food Shortages 'Preposterous' *[KCNA]* 5
Commentary Warns Against U.S. 'Smear Tactics' *[Pyongyang Radio]* 6
U.S. Envoy's Remarks on Nuclear Issue Viewed *[KCNA]* 8
Commentary Urges Crushing Japanese Rearmament *[Pyongyang Radio]* 9
IAEA's Blix Expresses Support for Nuclear Policy *[Pyongyang Radio]* 10
Kim Yong-nam Arrives in New York for UN Session *[Pyongyang Radio]* 10

South Korea

No Tae-u Reflects on Term as President *[CHUNGANG ILBO 22 Sep]* 10
Representative Office in Hanoi Set To Open 9 Oct *[YONHAP]* 12
Taiwan Personnel 'Damage' Embassy Before Leaving *[HANGUK ILBO 25 Sep]* 12
Taiwan Gives 'Courteous' Treatment to Delegation *[YONHAP]* 12
Agreement With PRC on Atomic Energy Planned *[YONHAP]* 13
ROK Elected Vice President Country of IAEA *[YONHAP]* 13
South, North Senior Officials To Discuss Yi In-mo *[YONHAP]* 13
South-North Liaison Officials Meet in Panmunjom *[Seoul Radio]* 14
Agree on Nampo Survey Team *[YONHAP]* 14
Researcher Views DPRK Nuclear Capabilities *[SINDONG-A Jul]* 14
North Said Shifting Policy on Reunification *[THE KOREA TIMES 25 Sep]* 21

SOUTHEAST ASIA

Burma

Envoy to Thailand Named Deputy Foreign Minister *[Rangoon Radio]* 23
SLORC Said Continuing Offensive on Manerplaw *[Radio DVOB]* 23
New Rebel Group Said Operating Near Thai Border *[Bangkok BANGKOK POST 23 Sep]* 23

Cambodia

Khieu Samphan Explains Opposition to Logging Ban *[Radio VGNUFC]* 24
Ranariddh Interviewed on 10 Sep SNC Meeting *[Radio VOK]* 25
First Japanese Engineering Troops Arrive *[KYODO]* 28
Sihanouk Hosts Banquet for PRC Minister Xu *[Phnom Penh Radio]* 28
UK Minister of State Meets Sihanouk 22 Sep *[Phnom Penh Radio]* 29
Meets Chea Sim *[SPK]* 29

Indonesia

Suharto Urges Expanded UN Security Council *[ANTARA]* 29

Philippines

Ramos Criticizes Continuing Communist Struggle *[Quezon City Radio]* 30
Ramos Pardons Communist Leader, Releases 7 Rebels *[Manila Radio]* 31
Ramos Approves Auxiliary Police Force *[Manila Radio]* 31
Abadia Says Militia Unit Not To Be Abolished *[Manila Radio]* 31
Military To Continue Anti-Insurgency Operations *[Manila Radio]* 31
Military Rebels Confident in Unification Panel *[MANILA BULLETIN 20 Sep]* 31
Muslim Rebels Urged To Join Talks *[PHILIPPINE DAILY INQUIRER 25 Sep]* 32
Taiwan Not To Use F-16s To Boost Spratlys Claim *[MALAYA 25 Sep]* 32

Thailand

20 Burmese Rebel Soldiers Arrested at Border *[BANGKOK POST 25 Sep]* 33
Garment Exporters Skirting U.S. Quota Limits *[BANGKOK POST 25 Sep]* 33

Vietnam

Commentary on POW-MIA Issue, Trade Embargo *[Hanoi International]* 34
Vo Van Kiet Reelected Prime Minister *[Hanoi International]* 34
Comments on Action Program *[Hanoi Radio]* 34
Vo Van Kiet Biography *[VNA]* 34
VNA Profiles President Le Duc Anh 35
24 Sep National Assembly Proceedings Reported *[Hanoi Radio]* 35
Assembly Issues Communique No. 3 on 24 Sep *[Hanoi Radio]* 36
Assembly Continues Plenary Session 25 Sep *[Hanoi Radio]* 37
Morning Session Approves Namelists *[Hanoi Radio]* 37
Bill on Government Organization Presented 19 Sep *[Hanoi Radio]* 37

AUSTRALASIA

Papua New Guinea

Wingti Proposes Treaty With Solomon Islands *[Melbourne International]* 42

Solomon Islands

Abducted Man Claims Statements Made at Gunpoint *[Melbourne International]* 42

Vanuatu

Recognition of Taiwan Said Limited to Trade *[AFP]* 42

ASEAN Parliamentarians Hold General Assembly

Favor Formation of Free Trade Area

BK2309084092 Jakarta ANTARA in English 0756 GMT 23 Sep 92

[Text] Jakarta, Sept. 23 (OANA/ANTARA)—ASEAN parliaments associated in the ASEAN Interparliamentary Organisation (AIPO) consider the formation of ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) a step forward taken by countries in Southeast Asia, particularly those belonging to ASEAN in anticipating to the challenge of international economic cooperation.

In the second day of the general assembly of AIPO here Tuesday, the delegation head of Singapore's Parliament, Tan Soo Khoe, said that the formation of AFTA was of great importance to the maintenance of ASEAN interests in international trade cooperation.

In addition, AFTA is also important for the countries in this region to anticipate long-term development of the world's economy, especially with the system of world trade being inclined towards the formation of economic blocs.

With serious discussions among member countries of ASEAN, cooperation through AFTA will be reached to the satisfaction of all, said Tan.

According to him, AFTA will make ASEAN commodities more competitive in the international world arena and will remove trade barriers within the group.

In the meantime, Asa Meksawan, who heads the delegation of Thai Parliament, expressed the hope that the implementation of AFTA would be sped up so that ASEAN could immediately overcome their challenges, particularly in economic and international trade cooperation.

He reminded that the formation of economic blocs in the world such as those formed in Europe and in North America had required ASEAN countries to quickly respond to this condition and AFTA was the proper response to this tendency.

Cooperation with other areas is also of importance, Meksawan admitted, because this is beneficial to ASEAN countries and in this context he also expressed the hope that the rich countries would adopt the practice of freer trade so that ASEAN countries and the rich ones could benefit from this cooperation.

Discuss Human Rights

BK2309074092 Jakarta ANTARA in English 0400 GMT 23 Sep 92

[Text] Jakarta, Sep 23 (OANA/ANTARA)—ASEAN Interparliamentary Organization (AIPO) President M. Kharis Suhud has called on delegations in the 13th general assembly of the organisation to discuss AIPO's future.

Suhud said when opening the AIPO general assembly here Tuesday that an agreement on problems faced by the organization among new challenges in the 1990s could be achieved.

Suhud, concurrently Indonesian house speaker, said the current AIPO general assembly had different atmosphere compared with those held previously as a number of historical events had occured since the last general assembly taking place in Bangkok.

The AIPO president also pointed out that the 12th general assembly had urged AIPO to formulate guidelines reflecting the basic ASEAN perception and approaches toward issues on human rights in accordance with values and philosophies adopted in the ASEAN countries.

Human rights have become a big international problem, Suhud noted, adding that the ASEAN foreign ministerial meeting in Manila has noted that human rights were basically swayed by among other things, the history, culture and socio-economic condition in every country.

Kharis Suhud also agreed on the interparliamentary role in making efforts to radically solve problems on the developing countries' debts.

On the same day, the political, economic and social committees proposed agenda to be discussed at the general assembly.

The political committee forwarded among other things materials on political and security cooperation, Cambodian issue, reconstruction programs for Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia as well as human rights in ASEAN.

Japan

PRC Vice Premier Comments on Emperor's Visit

OW2509062092 Tokyo KYODO in English 0552 GMT 25 Sep 92

[Text] Tokyo, Sept. 25 KYODO—China will make every effort to ensure the success of Emperor Akihito's visit next month, Vice Premier Wu Xueqian told House of Representatives speaker Yoshio Sakurauchi on Friday.

"Because it is the first (visit by a Japanese emperor to China) in history, we are taking it very seriously and want to make it a success," Wu said during a 30-minute chat with Sakurauchi at the lower house leader's official residence.

Sakurauchi responded that while there are different opinions in Japan concerning the emperor's visit, "We would like to see it realized and hope for its success."

Wu also said he hopes the newly established relations between Beijing and Seoul will play a role in inter-Korean relations and indicated he looks forward to improved relations between Japan and North Korea.

"Although it appears that North Korea holds a sense of isolation, China is an old friend and we anticipate the efforts of the Japanese Government (in improving relations with Pyongyang)," Wu said.

Wu later met with Koko Sato, chairman of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party's executive council, who asked him for China's "consideration" over an apology by the emperor during his visit.

Alluding to demands by some Chinese that the emperor apologize for Japanese atrocities during the war, Sato told Wu that, "in order to create a new era of Japan-China relations, we have realized the visit by the decision of the powers in the party."

"For the success of the visit, we hope the Chinese side will proceed with consideration," Sato told Wu.

Sato also stressed that Japan is sending troops and other personnel to Cambodia to cooperate with the nation's reconstruction and thus is completely different from the past, LDP officials said. Wu simply urged for prudence in the dispatch, the officials added.

Foreign Minister Watanbe in New York

Urges African Nations To Attend Conference

OW2409000592 Tokyo KYODO in English 2318 GMT 23 Sep 92

[Text] New York, Sept. 23 KYODO—Japan's Foreign Minister Michio Watanabe urged African nations on Wednesday to go to Tokyo next year to participate in an international conference on how to relieve poverty in Sub-Saharan Africa. Organizers hope the Africa Development Conference, which Tokyo will host in the autumn of 1993, will chart the course of democratization and economic development in what is one of the world's poorest regions.

Cooperation from Africa is vital for the success of the conference, Watanabe said during a luncheon he hosted for a group of African foreign ministers. Watanabe, in New York for the United Nations General Assembly session, also used the occasion to stress Japan's commitment to help Africa, both through humanitarian aid and assistance to promote economic development.

Japan provides about 1 billion dollars a year in economic aid to Africa, Japanese officials said. As part of its foreign aid program, Japan will be co-sponsoring the Africa Development Conference along with United Nations and an international nongovernmental forum known as the Global Coalition for Africa.

Japanese officials said foreign ministers and representatives from about 40 African nations attended the luncheon hosted by Watanabe at a New York hotel.

Urges Rio Group To Back Peru's Election Plan

OW2409024292 Tokyo KYODO in English 0158 GMT 24 Sep 92

[Text] New York, Sept. 23 KYODO—Japanese Foreign Minister Michio Watanabe called Wednesday on the Rio Group of Latin American countries to support Peru's national election scheduled for November 22 for an 80-member Constituent Assembly.

Watanabe made the call in a meeting in a New York hotel with the foreign ministers of Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Paraguay, and Venezuela, as well as the acting foreign ministers of Mexico, Bolivia, and Uruguay. Jamaica and Honduras participated in the meeting as observers. The 13-member Rio Group, Latin America's largest consultative body, has held meetings to discuss the region's political and economic issues since December 1986.

Watanabe said Japan has urged Peru to restore constitutional democracy after Peruvian President Alberto Fujimori suspended the Constitution, dissolved Congress, and imposed a state of emergency in April. The United States, Latin American and some European countries criticized the move, and the U.S. froze its aid to Peru.

According to the Japanese Foreign Ministry, the Latin American foreign ministers praised Japan's efforts to help Peru pave the way for the restoration of democracy, saying Latin American countries are also making a diplomatic effort to put Peru back on the democratic road. Fujimori in April announced the plan to hold elections for a restructured one-chamber assembly with 80 members. The old Congress consisted of a 60-member Senate and a 180-member Chamber of Deputies.

Watanabe said the diplomatic pillars of relations between Japan and Latin American countries are to extend economic aid to the countries and cooperate with

them to promote the earth's environment and major global problems. He said Japan wants to accelerate the promotion of personnel exchanges with Central and South American countries. The Latin American foreign ministers replied that their countries want to promote relations with Japan, which they described as one of the most important countries in the world, according to Japanese officials.

Spokesman Welcomes New Thai Prime Minister

OW2509081092 Tokyo KYODO in English 0644 GMT 25 Sep 92

[Text] Tokyo, Sept. 25 KYODO—Japan welcomes the appointment of Chuan Likhpai as Thailand's new prime minister at the head of a five-party coalition government, Foreign Ministry spokesman Masamichi Hanabusa said Friday [25 September].

He said Chuan's appointment to the premiership Wednesday was undertaken "in accordance with democratic procedures."

The 54-year-old veteran politician, who heads the Democrat Party, emerged as Thailand's new leader after the September 13 general elections.

He takes over from an interim government appointed in the aftermath of May's bloody crackdown by the military on pro-democracy demonstrators in Bangkok.

"The Government of Japan strongly hopes that the political process in Thailand will proceed peacefully along democratic lines under the new Chuan administration," Hanabusa said.

Describing Thailand as a key country in Southeast Asia, he said Japan hopes that political and social stability there will have a favorable effect on the whole region.

He also expressed Japan's hope to see continued economic stability in Thailand, with which Japan has extensive economic ties.

Kanemaru Agrees To Accept Summary Indictment

OW2509062692 Tokyo KYODO in English 0603 GMT 25 Sep 92

[Text] Tokyo, Sept. 25 KYODO—Ruling party strongman Shin Kanemaru gave prosecutors a written statement Friday admitting he accepted far more money from the Sagawa Kyubin business group than allowed by law.

Kanemaru also agreed in a separate statement to accept a summary indictment from prosecutors, which will allow a judge to rule on the case without bringing the 78-year-old the former vice president of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) in for questioning or making him stand trial. The moves apparently ended an impasse with the Tokyo District Public Prosecutors' Office, which had repeatedly asked Kanemaru to submit to questioning on the widening scandal centering on the giant trucking group.

Prosecutors are expected to file the summary indictment, under which a judge imposes a penalty on a defendant without holding a trial, accusing Kanemaru of violating the Political Funds Control Law, sources said.

Kanemaru's lawyer Masahiro Abe gave prosecutors the statement acknowledging that the 500 million yen from Tokyo Sagawa Kyubin Co. was a political donation to Kanemaru, sources said.

"I am the one who is responsible, so I will accept all responsibility," Kanemaru reportedly told his attorney before signing the statement drafted by his legal team.

The law sets a ceiling of 1.5 million yen in political donations a lawmaker can receive form any individual or corporation in a single year. Violators face up to 200,000 yen in fines.

Kanemaru admitted in late August that he had received the 500 million yen in unreported political funds from Hiroyasu Watanabe, former president of Tokyo Sagawa Kyubin, before the February 1990 general election. He resigned as LDP vice president but remained head of the LDP's biggest faction.

Although prosecutors have repeatedly asked Kanemaru to submit to questioning, the LDP kingmaker has consistently refused to comply. As a result, prosecutors set a Thursday deadline for him to submit to questioning, saying they would not pursue questioning if he submitted a written statement admitting he violated the Political Funds Control Law.

Watanabe is on trial, charged with aggravated breach of trust involving Tokyo Sagawa Kyubin, which was later absorbed by Kyoto-based Sagawa Kyubin Co.

Kanemaru would be the first Diet member indicted on charges of violating the Political Funds Control Law.

Opposition parties are pushing to have Kanemaru summoned as a sworn witness in Diet investigations of the scandal.

Kanemaru's submission to a summary indictment has political implication for the future of the cabinet of Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa and the Takeshita Faction, which Kanemaru heads, political analysts said.

The influence of Kanemaru, the LDP's strongest power broker and an instrumental figure in bringing Miyazawa to power last November, will decline in the faction as well as the party, they said.

Ichiro Ozawa, former LDP secretary general and deputy head of the faction, who has staunchly opposed a summary indictment, will also be put in a delicate position, they said.

Kanemaru has shut himself in his Tokyo home, and reporters have kept a constant vigil in front of the house since he resigned as LDP vice president on August 27.

Prosecutors said Tuesday in the opening of Watanabe's trial in Tokyo district court that Watanabe knew in September 1987 that a politician he was associated with was being troubled by activities of a right-wing group.

Watanabe called on the late Susumu Ishii, former head of Japan's second-largest "Yakuza" syndicate, Inagawa-kai, to settle the matter, and the right-wing group stopped its activities the next month, prosecutors told the court.

Prosecutors did not name the politician, but they were apparently referring to Kanemaru.

The right-wing group Kominto was using loudspeaker trucks to harass Noboru Takeshita before his November 1987 election as LDP president, and thus, prime minister.

Watanabe began financing massive illegal loans and debt guarantees to companies connected with Yakuza gangsters and other companies after that, prosecutors said.

Sagawa Kyubin Head Said Influenced Cabinet Posts

OW2409120292 Tokyo KYODO in English 1154 GMT 24 Sep 92

[Text] Tokyo, Sept. 24 KYODO—Hiroyasu Watanabe, a key figure in the Tokyo Sagawa Kyubin scandal, allegedly influenced power broker Shin Kanemaru in selecting the justice minister in a cabinet formed in 1989, informed sources said Thursday [24 September].

Yasuo Matsuzawa, former president of the Heiwado Real Estate Group, told KYODO NEWS SERVICE that Watanabe asked an influential person to install Kazuo Tanikawa as justice minister in the cabinet led by former Prime Minister Sosuke Uno, which was inaugurated in June 1989.

Matsuzawa, 41, who has been indicted on charges of aggravated breach of trust in connection with the scandal, refused to disclose the person's name.

However, other sources said the figure was believed to be Kanemaru, former vice president of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP).

Matsuzawa said he asked Watanabe, former president of Tokyo Sagawa Kyubin Co., to give Tanikawa a ministerial post.

He said Watanabe replied, "Most of the ministers' posts are already occupied but justice minister is not..." Immediately after that, Watanabe telephoned the person about the request, Matsuzawa said.

Tanikawa, an LDP veteran, has denied he asked Watanabe to prod Kanemaru into considering him for the ministerial post. Kanemaru's office also ruled it out.

Watanabe, 58, has been indicted on charges of aggravated breach of trust for inflicting enormous financial damage on Tokyo Sagawa.

Kanemaru has acknowledged he received 500 million yen in a shady political donation from Tokyo Sagawa.

Report Indicates Economy Continuing To Slow

OW2509022492 Tokyo KYODO in English 0115 GMT 25 Sep 92

[Text] Tokyo, Sept. 25 KYODO—Japan's economy is still in an adjustment phase, with both consumer spending and corporate capital investment continuing to decline, the Economic Planning Agency (EPA) said in a report Friday [25 September]. The monthly report, approved by the cabinet, noted that only housing starts and public works spending are recovering, while all other economic data paint a gloomy picture. Amid continued inventory adjustments, production is also slowing and corporate earnings are declining.

But an EPA official said, "The 10.7 trillion yen emergency package approved by the cabinet in late August has eased widespread fears that the bottom of the nation's economy is about to fall out."

"Recovering housing starts and increased public works spending may not immediately offset the total decline in domestic demand, but the economy will recover eventually," he said.

As for the rapid rise in the yen's value on foreign exchanges during the past few days, the official said it will take some time before Japan's economy as a whole feels the impact. Rather, the stronger yen will encourage confidence among the Japanese business community for the time being, he said.

The report said consumer spending is continuing to shrink, with department store sales dropping by a month-on-month 1.6 percent in July, following a 4.0 percent drop in June. Sales at supermarkets rose a negligible 0.9 percent in July, after falling 1.1 percent in June, indicating spending curtailments even on everyday items. The number of new car registrations dropped 17.8 percent in August from a year earlier, the report showed. The number of housing starts rose 4.9 percent in July from a year earlier, following a 1.0 percent rise in June and 0.1 percent drop in May.

Private corporate investment continued to decline 3.4 percent in the second quarter, with investment by small and medium-sized companies declining 31.7 percent.

Public works spending rose 1.9 percent in July from a year earlier, after rising 12.4 percent in June. The figure shows only the number of projects actually started in the month, but there were more projects ordered as a result of the front-loading of public works spending this fiscal year, the EPA said.

Corporate earnings are slowing, with major manufacturers projecting an average 30.2 percent year-on-year drop in pretax profit for the first six months of the current fiscal year. The number of bankruptcies in August was 1,194, about level with the previous month but up 33.3 percent from a year earlier.

Export growth to other countries in Asia, Central America and the Middle East slowed, while imports declined by monthly comparison. Domestic wholesale prices were easing and consumer prices were remaining stable, the report said.

MITI Expects Worst in Late Autumn

OW2209123492 Tokyo KYODO in English 1211 GMT 22 Sep 92

[Text] Tokyo, Sept. 22 KYODO—A high-ranking trade ministry official said Tuesday the economy is likely to hit bottom in late autumn, suggesting that more time is needed to enter the recovery phase.

The official of the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) told reporters that inventory reduction has not yet progressed sufficiently for such consumption goods as automobiles and consumer electronics.

His comments came in connection with remarks earlier in the day by Shunji Fukimbara, deputy chief of the Economic Planning Agency, noting that the April-June quarter was the toughest period so far.

Fukimbara spoke to reporters after the release of Japan's gross national product figures for the quarter.

Foreign Share of Microchip Market Rises

OW2509041292 Tokyo KYODO in English 0309 GMT 25 Sep 92

[Text] Tokyo, Sept. 25 KYODO—The share of foreign-made microchips in the Japanese market rose 1.3 percentage points in the second quarter from the previous quarter to 17.9 percent, the Ministry of International Trade and Industry reported Friday [25 September].

The ministry said the growth was the result of efforts by Japanese users to buy more foreign semiconductors despite the sluggish Japanese computer chip market. The figure includes "captive" microchips sold by a U.S. producer to its Japanese unit and "branded" chips made by Japanese companies but sold in Japan under the brand names of foreign firms.

Under a U.S. calculation formula, which excludes such products, the foreign share for the same period stood at 16.0 percent, up 1.4 percentage points from the previous three-month period, the ministry said.

The Japan-U.S. Chip Trade Pact, agreed in August last year, provides that foreign chip makers can expect a share of more than 20 percent of the Japanese semiconductor market by the end of this year. Japan maintains the 20 percent share is a target to try to reach, while the U.S. regards it as a Japanese commitment and urges it be attained, with a threat of retaliation.

Asked about the possibility of reaching the goal, a ministry official said, "it is difficult to predict. We will make efforts in line with the spirit of the pact."

The Electronic Industries Association of Japan welcomed the "significant improvement" in market share.

Nobuo Kanoi, chairman of the association's Users' Committee of Foreign Semiconductors, said in a press release the committee "will continue its efforts, based on the Japan-U.S. semiconductor arrangement, to structure further cooperative and healthy long-term relations with foreign semiconductor suppliers."

North Korea

Reports of Riots, Food Shortages 'Preposterous'

SK2509110692 Pyongyang KCNA in English 1037 GMT 25 Sep 92

["They Will Gain Nothing From False Propaganda"—KCNA headline]

[Text] Pyongyang September 25 (KCNA)—South Korean YONHAP news agency spread false reports regarding the currency exchange in the DPRK in July, saying that "riots broke out one on the heels of the other in some cities of the North" and that the North is "intending to disperse and move some urban dwellers to local areas to solve the food shortage."

This is another unfounded false propaganda, a product of their despicable plot to tarnish the image of the DPRK and mislead public opinion at home and abroad.

The reports of South Korean "Government"-subsidized news agency are so preposterous and ridiculous that they are not worth serious refutation. However, we cannot but clarify the truth because they spread the false reports.

The northern half of our republic is a socialist society of our own style centred on the masses, an embodiment of the great chuche idea.

In our country the desire and demand of the popular masses are met most thoroughly and the leader, the party and the masses are singleheartedly united in one organism.

In this regard, Koreans overseas and many foreigners were very envious when they visited the northern half.

There can never be and has never been a riot in our society of singlehearted unity where the leader and the party believe in the people and deeply love them while the people absolutely trust and uphold the leader and the party.

Riot can be seen in such a place as unpopular and corrupt South Korean society where contradictions

between the dominating classes and the dominated classes grow acute and the rulers oppress the people at the point of the bayonet.

Their false propaganda about "riot" and the like shows that they are despicable plot-breeders.

The case is the same with "shortage of food."

Food is self-sufficient and all people live a happy life without any worries about food in our land where "Theses on the Socialist Rural Question in Our Country" indicating a brilliant way of solving the peasant and agricultural questimns has been successfully implemented and the electrification, irrigation, mechanization and extensive use of chemicals in agriculture have reached a high level.

The state supplies the people with food at a cheap price next to nothing so that people do not know how much rice costs. This is the reality of the northern half of Korea.

The propaganda about "riot," "shortage of food" and "evacuation for the dispersion of population" is a sheer fabrication invented by the plot-mongers for the sinister political purpose of misleading public opinion and diverting elsewhere the attention of the people at home and abroad who sympathize with the advantages of Korean-style socialism and our social system of single-hearted unity.

Nobody will be taken in by such false propaganda.

It reveals the serious crisis of the South Korean authorities that they have invented false reports in the backroom and kicked up a vicious smear campaign against the DPRK.

The government power-backed rigging of the 14th "National Assembly elections" has been exposed in South Korea to drive the "Democratic Liberal Party [DLP]" into a tight corner and the "DLP" is now on the eve of split-up with internal contradictions and discord growing acute.

To cap it all, the U.S. pressure for import liberalization has been intensified and the economy has gone bankrupt so that foreign debts have increased and the resentments of the people suffering from non-rights and poverty are ever growing.

In a bid to save themselves from this predicament, the South Korean authorities are slandering the DPRK and trying to sidetrack the popular sentiments running to it by a smear campaign against the North, thus bridging over their serious ruling crisis.

Their smear campaign reminding us of a drowning man catching at a straw only reveals their hopeless position.

We cannot but tell a few words to the literary hacks and press that mechanically repeat the false propaganda of the authorities, throwing away the conscience of the pressman.

Those hell bent on the anti-DPRK smear campaign are destined to meet a stern judgement by history.

South Korean journalists would be well advised to look straight at the situation and act with discretion. It will be good for them.

The South Korean authorities must stop at once the smear campaign against the DPRK as foolish as spitting at the sky and take a stand of seeking reconciliation and unity.

Commentary Warns Against U.S. 'Smear Tactics'

SK2509042092 Pyongyang Korean Central Broadcasting Network in Korean 0020 GMT 25 Sep 92

[NODONG SINMUN 25 September commentary: "Let Us Heighten Vigilance Against the Fabrication of Slanderous, Smear Incidents by U.S. Imperialists and Military Fascist Forces Who Face Crisis"]

[Text] Today very alarming moves [simsangchi anhun umjigim] are observed within the U.S. imperialists and the military fascist forces of the Democratic Liberal Party [DLP] in South Korea with the approach of presidential elections late this year.

Such moves are shown in political smear maneuvers which started by concocting the Kim Nak-chung fixed spy incident and the Hwang In-ho spy incident. Thus, there are indications that the U.S. imperialists and military dictatorial forces may concoct unexpected shocking, slanderous incidents in an effort to settle the crisis in their colonial fascist rule.

It is not an accident that they are trying to depend on such shock therapy [chunggyok yopob]. This has something to do with the internal situation of the DLP, which is being driven into the state of collapse amid complex and acute political situation created in the wake of the upcoming election.

Although there is a considerable time until the announcement of the election date and the start of legal period for the election campaign, each political party and each faction in South Korea has already embarked on a fierce movement to occupy the central position of power.

Kim Yong-sam from the DLP, the ruling party; Kim Tae-chung from the Democratic Party [DP], Chong Chu-yong from the United People's Party [UPP], and Pak Chan-chong from the Party for New Politics, all opposition parties, have emerged as presidential candidates. It is not certain who else will come into the site of struggle for power.

Pak Chol-on, Pak Tae-chun, and Yi Chong-chan from the Democratic Justice [DJ] faction have been confronted in the past with Kim Yong-sam, who is called a frantic seeker of presidential power, from the Democratic faction within the DLP. They rejected each other, being engrossed with the ambition for power, and fights continued. As the result, their party has been driven to the dangerous brink of dissolution.

However, they each share a common feeling of anxiety that if the party collapses, they would all perish together. Thus, they were barely able to settle internal conflicts and discords through behind-the-scenes negotiations and bargains.

The DLP appeared to have settled problems for the moment by outwardly designating Kim Yong-sam as its presidential candidate under the behind-the-scenes manipulation of the United States. However, on 17 August, Yi Chong-chan declared his secession from the party and left the DLP. Following this, he formed the popular alliance of new politics. As a result, the struggle for presidential power has become more complex and more fierce.

As for Yi Chong-chan, he competed with Kim Yong-sam for the DLP nomination but gave up the competition last May on the pretext of outside pressure. Later, he expressed the will to leave the DLP.

Yi Chong-chan has been subject to pressure from the incumbent ruler to refrain from leaving the party by reason of the fact that his secession may cause the collapse of the DLP. Thus, his secession from the party has been temporarily withheld. However, No Tae-u's ruling power in its last stage could not prevent him from leaving the party.

Although Yi Chong-chan was repressed in the competition for the DLP nomination by Kim Yong-sam, the rate of support for Yi Chong-chan within the DLP reached 32.1 percent, and assemblymen who support him numbered as many as 30. In view of this, his secession from the party will not only remain, but will throw a dark shadow on the DLP's strategy for the presidential election.

The day after Yi Chong-chan's secession from the party, Pak Chol-on, an anti-Kim Yong-sam provocateur within the DLP and head of Laurel Club of the DJ faction, officially expressed his will to leave the party in September or October.

He then said that his intent to secede from the party had already been consulted with Yi Chong-chan and that he wants Yi Chong-chan's secession from the party to become the banner for a new form of polictics. Thus, he inspired other DLP lawmakers to secede from the party. Such being the situation, on 21 September Yi Chong-chan met with Chong Ho-yong—who has already seceded from the DLP, turning his back on the present ruler and is now an independent lawmaker—agreed in principle with him to found a new party as soon as possible and to designate the presidential candidate for the new party.

Such moves have caused an unfavorable reaction to the DLP's presidential election strategy designed to continue its stay in power by fabricating the Kim Yong-sam regime under the disguise of establishing a civilian ruling regime and have dealt great blows to the heinous U.S. plot of attempting to achieve stability in its colonial, fascist rule in South Korea by means of the criminal merger of the three parties.

The firm public sentiment in South Korea today is to overthrow the DLP regime and, thus, to end the military fascist rule with the upcoming presidential election as the occasion. In light of past experiences, it is clear that DLP rabbles will perpetrate all sorts of irregularities and fraud in the upcoming election by mobilizing government power and money. However, despite the fact that the three parties of the Democratic Justice Party, the Democratic Party, and the Republican Party illicitly founded one party called the DLP according to the U.S. scenario on the great alliance of conservative parties, these DLP rabbles face a situation of a small ruling party and a big opposition as a result of the general elections last spring. Such being the case, the public sentiment, which is inclined toward overthrowing the DLP regime with the upcoming presidential election as the occasion, cannot but become a serious threat to these DLP rabbles.

To make things worse, No Tae-u, who had been in discord with Kim Yong-sam in settling the political crisis caused by the incident of designating the second mobile telecommunications company and the declaration of conscience by the former head of Yongi County in South Chungchong Province, declared to withdraw from the DLP on 18 September under the precondition that he would conduct the presidential election fairly. Following this, more than 10 ministers, vice ministers, and secretaries in Chongwadae who hold DLP membership declared that they would secede from the party. Kyonggi Provincial Council deputies from the DLP, as well, declared their secession from the party. As a result, the DLP has dropped from the ruling party to the pro-government first party and, thus, has met the crisis of collapse.

However, it is wrong to judge that the possibility of fabricating a DLP regime again has completely disappeared because the DLP has been driven into such a serious corner internally and externally. In fact, it was the United States who made the successive presidents in South Korea, and accordingly the presidential election conducted according to party politics in South Korea is virtually nothing but a decoration to maintain U.S. imperialist colonial rule in South Korea.

Of course, the presidential election in South Korea itself depends greatly on the attitude of the United States. However, it should be kept in mind that everything cannot be smoothly carried out as it wishes.

The present South Korean situation in which the reorganization of the power structure for colonial rule is proceeding reminds us of the period of the Chang Myong regime right after the 19 April popular uprising. In fact, the fever of the struggle of the South Korean students, youth, and people for independence, democracy, and reunification surpasses the time when they rose up in the struggle to remove the barrier of division under the slogan of "Reunification is the only way for survival," "Let us go to the North," "Come to the South," and "Let us meet at Panmunjom."

The U.S. imperialists and the military fascist forces who are faced with the people's strong spirit of struggle against the DLP are at a grave crisis in their rule. It is well known that whenever U.S. colonial rule over South Korea began, the United States, in collusion with the pro-U.S. military dictatorial forces, fabricated [chojak hada] shocking incidents, misled public opinion at home and abroad, and, thus, resolved the crisis in its rule.

The unstable political situation in South Korea suggests that the United States, which seeks to perpetuate its colonial rule over South Korea, and its followers, the treacherous military fascist forces, may again resort to a vicious scheme to resolve a crisis in their rule in case the upcoming presidential election is not held according to their script. No one can say this is an empty statement that we make out of a useless precaution or a groundless speculation.

During the turbulent period right after the 15 August liberation when the South Korean people's patriotic fervor to build an independent democratic state was heightened, the United States declared a military rule, assassinated Mr. Yo Un-hyong, president of the People's Party, for being uncooperative in the military rule, held the bloody 10 May elections solely in South Korea, and fabricated the puppet Syngman Rhee regime. Also, when its colonial rule was shaking at its foundation because of the 19 April people's uprising, the United States had Syngman Rhee leave Chongwadae [presidential residence] after issuing the statement that he would step down and fabricated the Chang Myon regime on a temporary basis. After escaping from the crisis in this way, the United States fabricated the Pak Chong-hui military fascist regime by staging the 16 May military coup d'etat. Also, when it could no longer maintain its colonial rule because of the October 1979 people's resistance for democracy, the United States fabricated the drama of shooting Pak Chong-hui to death, had Choe Kyu-ha serve as president on a temporary basis, and staged, behind the scenes, the 12 December coup d'etat to take power, the 17 May fascist violence, and the large-scale Kwangju massacre and, thus, fabricated the murderous Chon Tu-hwan regime. And, when its colonial rule was faced with a dire crisis in the wake of the June 1987 people's resistance, the United States gave the deceptive 29 June declaration for democracy, played a game of changing running dogs, and had the current South Korean ruler gain power. All of these facts testify how persistently and openly the U.S. imperialists have maneuvered to extend its colonial rule.

Speculation is already rife in South Korea about what plots the United States and its followers may weave to extend the colonial rule. In the June 1992 issue of the monthly MAL, a South Korean current affairs specialist writes that the more serious the crisis becomes, the more the U.S. and military fascist forces will leave no stones unturned to satiate its greed and maintain its vested rights and eventually stage a military coup d'etat and other violent incidents after taking off the mask of using legal means.

The military fascist forces have always implemented the plans that the United States has mapped out to escape from crises. Considering this fact, it is convincing that under today's circumstances in South Korea, the United States may stage a new military coup to extend the dictatorship. As we know from the passenger plane incident that they fabricated just before the presidential election in late 1987, the U.S. imperialists and the South Korean rulers may stage another vicious, slanderous, anticommunist drama that man can in no way imagine and use this drama as a means to escape from the crisis facing them. We should heighten vigilance against the possibility that they can fabricate such shocking, anti-communist, slanderous incidents as provocations against the North and the assassination of politicians to escape from the crisis.

If the political plots and maneuvers by the U.S. imperialists and the military fascist forces to reserve the waves of democracy are left unchecked, and if the DLP dictatorial forces' regaining of power is fabricated, either the hope for democracy that people attained by shedding blood or the goal of democracy that people will attain when they take one step further will again disappear, and the dawn of peace and reunification will perish instantly.

Not to repeat the regrettable episodes that they failed to stop the 16 May military coup d'etat 32 years ago and have the fruit of direct presidential election, which they reaped in the June people's resistance, taken away by the military dictators, all the patriotic democratic forces in South Korea who aspire for the antifascist cause of democracy must maintain vigilance against various shock therapies and slanderous incidents which may be staged on and around the presidential election as masterminded by the United States and check and frustrate their plots in a timely manner.

U.S. Envoy's Remarks on Nuclear Issue Viewed

SK2509062592 Pyongyang KCNA in English 0504 GMT 25 Sep 92

["Fabrication by U.S., Japan and South Korean Authorities"—KCNA headline]

[Text] Pyongyang September 25 (KCNA)—A NODONG SINMUN analyst today hits out at the United States, Japan and the South Korean authorities for slinging mud

at the DPRK over the nuclear problem, seeking insidious purposes over the nuclear problem.

The news analyst says:

No Tae-u of South Korea said on September 17 that "North-South mutual inspection" is the "only way for the North to improve relations with the United States and Japan," and Gregg, the U.S. ambassador to South Korea, told a news conference on the following day that it was probable that the North had moved nuclear development facilities to another place. And now come from the Japanese ruling quarters the words "it is difficult to establish relations unless it is confirmed that the North has withdrawn its nuclear development program."

This racket bespeaks that the U.S., Japan and the South Korean authorities, seeing eye to eye with each other, are framing a new plot to increase the "nuclear suspicion" against the North and thus decry its peaceful nuclear policy, put pressure upon it and isolate it on the international scene.

And it must be noted that they set the solution of the nuclear problem of the North as a precondition for the improvement of relations with other countries. This reveals their sinister intention to drop a checkbar on the road of normalization of relations between it and the United states and between it and Japan.

The innocence of the DPRK's nuclear program has been made clear through inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency, and international sympathy and solidarity with the DPRK's peaceful nuclear policy are growing. Flurried by this, the U.S., Japan and the South Korean authorities are trying to turn aside the accusing fingers of the unbiased internal and external public pointed at them by false charges against the North.

They plan to put renewed pressure on the North by taking the nuclear problem to the U.N. arena and "internationalizing" it.

Truth cannot be kept in darkness by fabrications.

However hard they may try to put unjust pressure on the North in conspiracy, the U.S., Japan and the South Korean authorities cannot harvest a good result.

Commentary Urges Crushing Japanese Rearmament

SK2509032792 Pyongyang Korean Central Broadcasting Network in Korean 1150 GMT 23 Sep 92

[Commentary by station commentator Yun Pyong-son: "Japan's Maneuvers To Arm Itself With Nuclear Arms Should Be Frustrated and Smashed"]

[Text] According to reports, 51 South Korean Protestant Christian organizations, including the Korean Association of Methodist Churches, formed the Christian Committee Against Japanese Militarism and Nuclear Armament on 21 September.

In a declaration, the Christian committee, after stating that Japan's move to become a major military power and arm itself with nuclear weapons poses a serious threat to our national peace and survival, resolved to oppose Japanese military forces' overseas venture under the pretext of participating in the UN peacekeeping activities and nuclear armament.

The formation of a Christian committee in South Korea can be said to be an affirmative move to cope with Japanese maneuvers to become a major military power and arm itself with nuclear weapons.

As is widely known, Japan, forgetting about the serious historic lesson it was taught in the past, is now running toward becoming a major military power.

For the 1993 fiscal year that begins next April, the Japan Defense Agency asked for 4.72 trillion yen for military spending, an increase of more than 32 times as compared with the military spending earmarked in 1957.

A U.S. newspaper has noted that the Japan Self-Defense Force has at its disposal excellent military equipment far better than any other countries except the United States.

This notwithstanding, Japan is earnestly trying to become a major military power in order to arm the Self-Defense Force equipped with highly developed technology and equipment and make it operational in any given place of the world.

Japan's maneuvers to make itself a major military power is more dangerous in that it is coupled with its move to arm itself with nuclear arms.

Japan, which has already secured a large quantity of plutonium, is trying to lay in store a total of 100 tons of plutonium by 2010 by accelerating the production and shipment of plutonium from abroad.

A transport ship has recently left Yokohama Port to bring to Japan about a ton of plutonium from some European countries. This transport ship is expected to return to Japan before the end of this year.

With a large quantity of plutonium secured in storage and with its sufficient material and technological foundation necessary for the production of nuclear weapons at its disposal, Japan can produce nuclear weapons en masse whenever it decides to do so and once it starts producing nuclear weapons, it can easily become one of the world's major nuclear powers.

Under the pretext of an international contribution, the Japan Self-Defense Force has already begun its overseas venture.

Japan, which invaded countries in Asia, including ours, and forced indescribable misfortune and sufferings on the peoples of the region, is now dreaming of holding sway over the countries in Asia once again. That Japan not only refuses to frankly admit to its past sinful past smudged with aggression, plundering, slaughter, and

arson, but also is insincere in apologizing and compensating shows that it is about to repeat its past history of aggression.

It is not hard to guess what consequences Japan's move to arm itself with nuclear weapons and become a major military power will lead to on Asia and the Korean peninsula in particular.

It is no accident at all that the world, expressing concerns that Japan can plunge countries in Asia into nuclear catastrophe, raises voices denouncing Japan's venturous move.

This is precisely the reason why we raised the issue of taking joint actions against Japan not only at the sixth round of the North-South high-level talks, but also at the recent eighth round of talks and even went so far as to put forward a draft agreement on it.

The South side, however, was against our proposal. This, an act of protecting and supporting the Japanese authorities' move of threatening the survival of our people, lays bare in full view the South Korean authorities' antinational and anti-peace true colors.

Realities require that people from all walks of life in the North and South, instead of remaining a mere spectator to Japan's move to arm itself with nuclear weapons and become a major military power, raise vigilance and struggle against it.

It is quite natural for the 51 South Korean Protestant Christian organizations to form a Christian committee and vow to struggle against Japan's move to become a major military power and arm itself with nuclear weapons.

Our people who tasted the grief of being people without their own country under the Japanese imperialist colonial rule should frustrate and smash Japan's move to become a major military power and arm itself with nuclear weapons, if for no other reasons than to prevent the repetition of the past history and for national dignity and security.

IAEA's Blix Expresses Support for Nuclear Policy

SK2409152792 Pyongyang Korean Central Broadcasting Network in Korean 1200 GMT 24 Sep 92

[Text] Hans Blix, secretary general of the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA], extended his support to our country's peaceful nuclear policy at the 36th session of the IAEA general conference held in Vienna on 22 September.

In his report to the general conference, the secretary general said that although only a few months have passed since the DPRK submitted a primary inventory report last May on the nuclear materials, the subject for safeguards [tambo taesang], many verification projects have been conducted in three nonregular inspections.

Noting that the third inspection of our country was completed 10 days ago, he said that thanks to excellent cooperation offered by the DPRK, a series of detailed documents, including detailed regulations on report, have been written and completed. Some documents were effective as of 10 July.

Kim Yong-nam Arrives in New York for UN Session

SK2509001092 Pyongyang Korean Central Broadcasting Network in Korean 1300 GMT 24 Sep 92

[Text] A delegation of the DPRK led by Kim Yong-nam, vice premier and foreign minister, arrived in New York on 22 September to attend the 47th session of the UN General Assembly.

The delegation was greeted at the airport by protocol officials of the UN secretariat and by Pak Kil-yon, chief of the permanent mission of the DPRK to the United Nations, and members of the mission.

South Korea

No Tae-u Reflects on Term as President

SK2509013792 Seoul CHUNGANG ILBO in Korean 22 Sep 92 p 3-4

[Special interview with President No Tae-u by Yi Che-hun, editor-in-chief of CHUNGANG ILBO, on the 27th anniversary of the newspaper's founding—date and place not given]

[Excerpts] [Yi Che-hun] Your decision to quit the Democratic Liberal Party [DLP] and form a neutral election cabinet has sparked a controversy of a magnitude that no one could ever imagine. Could you please tell us what made you make such a decision?

[No Tae-u] It may be because I made the 29 June Declaration in 1987 and promised to push for democratization that the people elected me president.

To keep developing democracy, I believe, is responding to public desire, as well as my duty to history and nation.

When it was exposed that government officials had been involved in vote-buying activities in some regions during the 24 March general elections, and when it sparked a controversy, my disappointment was so great that I did not have words to describe how I felt.

I thought that this kind of thing should not be condoned and that I should take an epoch-making step to rectify the ways to hold elections in a manner of announcing another 29 June Declaration. That is how I made up my mind, based on the conviction that only in this way would I be able to bring an honorable end to the 29 June Declaration.

My idea about bringing the chaotic political situation under control, however, coincided with that of DLP President Kim Yong-sam in many aspects. I made up my

mind that I will form a neutral election cabinet by accepting President Kim's suggestions. But then I thought that this alone was not enough.

In order to transform this measure into a way of reforming the election management and achieving democracy, not a stopgap measure, I thought that the president should quit the party. Driven by my firm faith that only when the president is not a party member can he really be in a neutral position over the election, I decided to leave the party.

[Yi] Everyone in the country is anxious to know what will happen to politics now that you have quit the party.

[No] Since I have already decided to stay above day-to-day political affairs, it is not desirable for me to say this and that about the political future.

The only thing I would like to mention is that our politicians, too, must free themselves from the old political way of thinking. [passage omitted]

[Yi] Seen in the eye of the DLP, your decision may prove to be negative to President Kim Yong-sam's election to the office of the president, do you not think so?

[No] My decision was a declaration that I will not seek party interests and tactics. Now, can it be assessed in terms of party interests and tactics?

I hope that my sincere intention to make an epoch-making change in the way the election is held will be appreciated at face value. [passage omitted]

[Yi] On many occasions you have dropped hints that President Kim Yong-sam, with his long political background, his popularity among the people, and his experience in running the party as the governing party's president, will win in the election. Do you still believe that?

[No] As I have stated that I will watch the election from a strictly neutral position, it is not appropriate for me to predict the results of the election. [passage omitted]

[Yi] You have five months left in office. How do you rate your presidency over the past four years and seven months?

[No] Never before has our country since its founding gone through such great changes, both internally and externally, as in the past four years and seven months. Now, however, democracy has been realized in all domains of society and the government's legitimacy, human rights, and freedom of the press are no longer argued. [passage omitted]

[Yi] What do you think of the three-party merger at this juncture, including the fact that Mr. Kim Yong-sam has been nominated as the DLP presidential candidate?

[No] Because the DLP has been the nerve center in realizing political stability, we were able to overcome the chaos inherent in the incipient stage of democratization at an early stage and keep moving ahead in growth.

President Kim Yong-sam has become the governing party's presidential candidate by winning in an up-for-grabs contest of the governing party, the first of its kind in the constitutional history of our country. [passage omitted]

[Yi] Successful democratization and the northern policy are considered to be the greatest of your accomplishments as president and the patience you have demonstrated in the course of democratization stands out.

Do you think you are patient? What makes you endure so much?

[No] Maybe I was born to be patient. Impatience is characteristic of our people. When you endure the criticism heaped on you with patience, you find some acceptable. [passage omitted]

[Yi] You are scheduled to visit China shortly. Our great concern is what would you discuss mainly in a summit meeting with the Chinese leader. Are you expecting to meet Deng Xiaoping?

[No] What I would like to discuss in depth is how to develop relations between the South and North and how Korea and China can cooperate with each other for stability in Northeast Asia.

In fact, many people believe that our country begged China for the establishment of diplomatic relations, but it was China that was in a hurry to normalize its relations with our country. In a sense, China may feel grateful to us.

It is my knowledge that former chairman of the Military Commission Deng Xiaoping is now out of office and he usually declines to meet with foreign state leaders. No arrangement has been made for a meeting with me yet.

[Yi] When do you think reunification can be realized? What form of reunification do you think is desirable?

[No] Given the changed situation at home and abroad, I do not find any necessity to revise my view that it will be sometime during the nineties, at least before the current decade is out.

The proposal for reunifying the country on the basis of "a Korean community," which I put forward in a speech delivered at the National Assembly in September 1989, guarantees independence, peace, and democracy and is acceptable both to the South and North. I think the most desirable is to have the country reunified on the basis of this proposal.

[Yi] Citing economic troubles and the collapse of communism throughout the world, some observers predict that North Korea will collapse suddenly. If this happens, there may be some problems which we cannot bring under control.

[No] North Korea's task is to open itself up on the premise that its system will not collapse. Nobody knows what is going to happen and when. Unless, of course, if President Kim Il-song lives longer.... What is more, the economic difficulties are beyond imagination. Until last year, North Korea turned down every offer we made to help it. Now, however, North Korea admits to its economic difficulties, even to the point of being earnest in so doing.

We do not want riots or civil war to erupt in North Korea. We hope that change in North Korea will come in a peaceful, orderly manner.

If North Korea changes rapidly, it may have an impact on the Korean peninsula as a whole and it will not be desirable for all the Korean people in the North.

[Yi] You have been pushing for a South-North summit meeting since you took office. Is there anything about it that has not yet been made public?

[No] Everything about it is already public knowledge. The idea about a South-North summit meeting is aimed at reducing the chances of war and I believe that in practice it has been effective as a result of the successful northern policy. [passage omitted]

[Yi] What do you say about reconciling with former President Chon Tu-hwan?

[No] There can be a temporary misunderstanding between myself and the former president because of his different position. However, since he, too, places national interest ahead of everything, things will go smoothly if we meet and talk frankly, as far as circumstances and time permit. [passage omitted]

Representative Office in Hanoi Set To Open 9 Oct

SK2509031692 Seoul YONHAP in English
0302 GMT 25 Sep 92

[Text] Seoul, Sept. 25 (OANA-YONHAP)—South Korea will open its representative office in Vietnam at Boss Hotel in Hanoi Oct. 9, the Foreign Ministry said Friday.

Amb. Pak No-su will take post as head of the representative on Oct. 3, the ministry said.

Vietnam is expected to send a four-member advance team to Seoul Tuesday to prepare for its representative office opening scheduled for next month.

Hanoi's Ambassador Nguyen Phu Binh is to arrive in Seoul around Oct. 10.

Binh, said to be in his late 40s, ranks highest among the directors-general in the Vietnamese Foreign Ministry.

South Korea and Vietnam do not have diplomatic relations but are working toward them, most likely within this year. The two countries severed ties in 1974, when the Indochinese country was communized.

Taiwan Personnel 'Damage' Embassy Before Leaving

SK2509053192 Seoul HANGUK ILBO in Korean
25 Sep 92 p 23

[From the "Convex Lens" column]

[Text] After the Taiwan Embassy personnel completely withdrew from the embassy at 1500 on the afternoon of 23 September, the PRC Embassy in the ROK, which took over the embassy keys from the ROK Foreign Ministry, immediately sent an advance team, including (Lin Shengxun), counselor in charge of general affairs, and two others to the embassy located at 2-ka, Myong-dong, Seoul, and had them examine the inside of the building.

After examining the building from first to fifth floor together with an estimation team from a firm specializing in indoor decoration, the advance team concluded that it will take a long time to move to the embassy due to damage caused to the embassy building by the Taiwan personnel who "did not repress their flared emotion."

While removing all movable furniture and office fixtures, the Taiwan side inadvertently damaged or left unrepaired the fixed facilities. This put the relevant PRC Embassy officials at quite a loss, for they had planned to speedily move to the embassy after conducting simple repairs.

While removing electric-related tools and appliances, including light fixtures, they recklessly cut various electric wires and as a result, serious damage was caused to them. On the one hand, the PRC Embassy side urgently requested the Korea Electric and Power Company to conduct a safety check, and temporally installed electric lamps for its resident personnel in charge of management of the embassy building by connecting electric cables to automobile batteries.

Yim Sang-yol (40), manager of Philips Construction Company, who came to the embassy to make an estimate of repair costs, said: "After examining the building, we notified the PRC side that it will save time and money to completely dismantle and repair the inside rather than to partly repair and use it."

Taiwan Gives 'Courteous' Treatment to Delegation

SK2509030092 Seoul YONHAP in English
0207 GMT 25 Sep 92

[Text] Taipei, Sept. 25 (YONHAP)—A South Korean parliamentary delegation, led by Rep. Yi Se-ki of the Democratic Liberal Party, arrived here Thursday to attend a general meeting of the Asia-Pacific Parliamentary Union (APPU).

The five-member delegation arrived at Taipei International Airport in the afternoon via Hong Kong, one day after Taiwan and South Korea withdrew their embassies from each other's capital. Trade and direct air routes

between Seoul and Taipei have also been cut off, following the establishment of diplomatic relations with China.

Guided by members of the organizing committee, the Korean delegates went to a downtown hotel where the APPU session was to be held until Sept. 30.

The airport staff and the organizing committee members were very courteous and they gave an impression of taking better care of the South Korean delegation than the Japanese delegation, some members of the delegation said.

This was in striking contrast with the Taiwanese attitude toward a high-level South Korean delegation, led by former National Assembly speaker Kim Chae-sun, that visited here Sept. 15 on a fence-mending mission.

South Korean diplomats remaining here to clear up the unsettled affairs said Taiwan's anti-South Korean sentiment was slightly calmed down but the Taiwan Government's unfriendly attitude toward Seoul has not changed.

Agreement With PRC on Atomic Energy Planned

SK2409124892 Seoul YONHAP in English
1235 GMT 24 Sep 92

[Text] Seoul, Sept. 24 (YONHAP)—The government plans to conclude an atomic energy cooperation agreement with China and create a Northeast Asia nuclear safety and radioactive safegaurd organization at an early date.

Science and Technology Minister Kim Chin-hyon said Thursday evening that China and Japan agreed on his idea of a regional nuclear safety organization at the recent general meeting of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Vienna.

Meeting reporters at the Kimpo Airport upon his return home from Vienna, Kim said such a regional organization is a must in coping effectively with earth environment and greenhouse problems.

Minister Kim said that during the Vienna meeting he separately met Jiang Xinxiong, president of the China National Nuclear Industry Corp., and agreed with him on the conclusion of a Korea-China atomic energy cooperation agreement.

He said the two countries' working-level officials will meet in Beijing on Sept. 29 to disucss the proposed agreement concretely.

On North Korea's nuclear issue, the minister said that at the IAEA meeting he again called for the early implementation of inter- Korean nuclear inspections.

"I renewed the call because there has been no substantial progress in dispelling misgivings about the North's nuclear arms development despite the recent three inspections of North Korean facilities by IAEA inspectors," he said.

Minister Kim said he asked the IAEA to take due measures to ensure the safety of North Korea's nuclear facilities, and the IAEA gave him a positive response.

After the Vienna meeting he visited the EC headquarters in Brussels where it was agreed to conclude a Korea-EC science and technology cooperation agreement in November, Kim said.

ROK Elected Vice President Country of IAEA

SK2509013692 Seoul YONHAP in English
0116 GMT 25 Sep 92

[Text] Berlin [as received], Sept. 25 (YONHAP)—The 36th general meeting of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) closed Friday. A total of 116 member countries attended the five-day conference in Vienna.

The participants discussed intensively international joint management of plutonium, ways to promote international cooperation in the nuclear safeguards and strengthening of nuclear inspections.

Senior delegates of some countries, including Japan and Australia, claimed in their keynote speeches there remained a suspicion over North Korea's nuclear weapons development programs, urging North Korea to meet the IAEA's nuclear inspections in a sincerer manner and accept inter-Korean nuclear inspections at an early date.

South Korea was elected as a vice president country and its ambassador to Vienna Yi Si-yong chaired the congress Thursday.

South, North Senior Officials To Discuss Yi In-mo

SK2509104192 Seoul YONHAP in English
1029 GMT 25 Sep 92

[Text] Seoul, Sept. 25 (YONHAP)—South and North Korea are set to discuss the case of Yi In-mo at Panmunjom next week.

Yi is an ex-North Korean war correspondent captured in the South as a guerrilla fighter during the Korean war and had spent decades in prison for his attachment to communism.

North Korea strongly demands Yi's repatriation to the North, making it a prerequisite to any exchange or meeting of the family members dispersed between the two divided parts of Korea.

Yi Tong-pok, spokesman for the southern side of the South-North prime ministers talks, said Friday that during the eighth prime ministers meeting in Pyongyang last week, the two sides decided to have a separate contact to discuss Yi In-mo's issue.

"The proposed contact will begin sometime next week," Yi said.

During the Pyongyang meeting, the South suggested to resolve Yi's issue in return for the North's repatriation of the 12 fishermen of Tongchin-ho seized by the North in 1987, creation of a dispersed family meeting center at Panmunjom, and regularizing of the exchange of dispersed family hometown visitors.

"Our side's basic stand is that these three conditions should be met. But, it would depend on future talks with the North whether we shall stick to all of these conditions," the spokesman said.

An overall solution to the dispersed family issue will be sought in earnest through Red Cross talks after the question was first studied by the South-North social and cultural exchanges joint commission set to go into operation in November, Yi added.

South-North Liaison Officials Meet in Panmunjom

SK2509083692 Seoul KBS-1 Radio Network in Korean 0800 GMT 25 Sep 92

[Text] The South and North's liaison officials met in Panmunjom today. They agreed that both civilians and government officials should be on the Nampo survey team and that the survey team should go to the North for six days beginning 3 or 4 October.

The North and the South, however, disagreed about selecting the chief of the Nampo survey team and how many would be on the team. They agreed to meet on the afternoon of 28 September to continue negotiations.

Our side proposed that a director of the Daewoo Group be the chief of the Nampo survey team and that the size of the survey team number approximately 15. The North proposed that Kim U-chung, chairman of the Daewoo Group, be the chief of the survey team and that the team number 12.

Agree on Nampo Survey Team

SK2509094892 Seoul YONHAP in English 0918 GMT 25 Sep 92

[Text] Seoul, Sept. 25 (YONHAP)—South and North Korea finally agreed Friday to send a South Korean study team to look into the feasibility of the Nampo industrial estate project for six days beginning Oct. 3 or 4.

The two sides also decided that Deputy Prime Minister Choe Kak-kyu would make a planned visit to the North for five days after the visit of the feasibility survey team but not later than Oct. 20.

At a liaison officials contact held at Panmunjom, the South and the North agreed that the feasibility study team would comprise 12 to 15 persons including a few public officials and would be headed by a private person. The South emphasized that the feasibility survey team should in nature be a working-level study team for investment in the North, and the North in principle accepted theory.

The two sides decided to have another liaison officials contact at Panmunjom next Monday afternoon to discuss detailed itineraries for both the feasibility survey group and Deputy Premier Choe's visit.

At Friday's contact, the South suggested that the feasibility team would be headed by an executive of the Daewoo Business Group instead of Daewoo Chairman Kim U-chung as the North wanted.

The South reasoned that Chairman Kim does not want to take part in the study team because it rather is a working-level feasibility survey mission.

The North said they would disclose their stand over the issue of team head at the next contact.

As to the number of officials who would accompany Deputy Premier Choe to the North, the South wanted about 13 while the North insisted on 10 on the principle of reciprocity.

When the North's Deputy Premier Kim Tal-hyon visited the South last July, he was accompanied by nine officials.

Researcher Views DPRK Nuclear Capabilities

SK1409002892 Seoul SINDONG-A in Korean Jul 92 pp 262-284

[Article by Kim Min-sok, senior researcher at the Arms Control Research Center, under the Korea National Defense and Science Institute: "North Korea's Nukes—Their Urgent Examination"]

[Text] Following the rapidly developed International Atomic Energy Agency's [IAEA] recent North Korean nuclear inspections, the whole story on North Korean nuclear development is gradually appearing. North Korea possesses four operational atomic reactors, two generator reactors that are under independent construction, and a nuclear reactor power generator which has had construction stopped. Presumably, the probability is high that North Korea already has sufficient amounts of plutonium to manufacture three to six Nagasaki class nuclear warheads. Following is a concentrated analysis of North Korean nuclear power and its influence on the world's countries.

Iraq, which was subject to normal IAEA nuclear inspections, was pushing secret nuclear development until the end of the Gulf war in early 1992 and has spent the enormous amount of about $1 billion on this development. According to the IAEA inspection team, Iraqi nuclear facilities have progressed to the stage where they will be able to complete nuclear weapons development within only a year or two.

North Korea has also pursued nuclear development since the mid-1970's, and they will possess nuclear weapons at any time. Nuclear weapon development has continued under difficult international conditions and with enormously expensive investments to the point of even abandoning economical nuclear power. Additionally, even now as communism ebbs away with the collapse of the Soviet Union, North Korea cannot stop the inertia of its pursuit of nuclear power. However, international pressure concerning the North's nuclear development is gradually growing stronger, and the situation is urgently developing to the extent that the Yongbyon military intervention debate publicized by the United States has gained momentum.

After the rapid development of the recent IAEA North Korean nuclear inspections, the full story of North Korean nuclear development is gradually being exposed. On the basis of the results of the ad hoc IAEA inspections accomplished during a two-week period beginning 25 May 1992 and the data revealed during that period, we can try to analyze the consequences of North Korea's nuclear capabilities, influence, and attitude.

Capability To Manufacture One or Two Nuclear Warheads a Year

North Korea started atomic power development while concluding an agreement with the Soviet Union to participate in the establishment of the Soviet Dubuna [as published] Multinational Nuclear Research Center in March 1956. North Korea exchanged atomic power technology with East bloc scholars by sending dozens of scientists to the research center every year. Through this exchange, they were able to obtain the basis of atomic power development. An official conduit for atomic cooperation with the Soviet Union was established in September 1959 with the "USSR-DPRK Agreement Concerning Atomic Power Use."

In 1962 the system through which atomic power development could be pursued was perfected with the establishment of the atomic power research center at Yongbyon, which is being pointed to as the current area of contention. In June 1965 North Korea began full-scale research with the importation from the Soviet Union of a two megawatt-class thermal output research reactor called the IRT-2000. North Korea has used this research reactor, which is under IAEA inspection, for basic research training, and based on this has increased exchanges with the IAEA.

Looking at the results of the ad hoc inspections as reported by IAEA Director General Hans Blix to its director's meeting on 10 June 1992, with what has been reported thus far in the press, North Korea now possesses four operational atomic reactors, two power generating reactors currently being constructed independently, and an atomic power generating station which has had construction stopped. In addition, there are nine facilities related to spent fuel and one reprocessing facility which are operational or under construction. Five research centers and eight educational facilities related to atomic power are in operation.

As the No. 1 atomic reactor, which has been operational since 1987, was built independently by the North, it has not been subject to IAEA inspections. This graphite-moderator, gas-cooled atomic reactor (modeled after the British Calder Hall model) uses North Korean-made natural uranium as spent fuel and is ideal for producing plutonium for nuclear weapons use. They can manufacture one to two nuclear warheads with the eight to 11 kilograms of plutonium which can be manufactured in a year's time of normal operational time at this atomic reactor. Even if its presumed that the No. 1 reactor operated at a low level in the beginning, they could extract enough plutonium from the used spent fuel discharged by the end of 1991 to manufacture three to six rounds. Of course, they can extract this plutonium only after it has been reprocessed after having been in storage for a fixed time as it is mixed with used spent fuel which has been discharged from the atomic reactor.

The No. 2 atomic reactor, scheduled for completion around 1995, will resemble the No. 1 atomic reactor's features but its size and capacity is to be an extremely massive electrical output of the 50 megawatts-class and after completion will be subject to inspections. Accordingly, North Korea is not expected to use the No. 2 atomic reactor for nuclear weapons development.

Hidden Small-Scale Reprocessing Facility

As was revealed in the recent IAEA ad hoc inspections, North Korea's radiochemical testing facility is a reprocessing facility. Reprocessing is when plutonium, the material needed for nuclear weapons, is extracted by the chemical processing of the sediments (used spent fuel) which have been heated in an atomic reactor. North Korea contends that this facility, which is 180 meters long and five stories high, is a testing facility, but the IAEA has revealed that it is a full-scale reprocessing facility.

Considering that Japan's Sea of Japan reprocessing facility, which reprocesses 210 tons yearly, is 120 meters long, one can guess the reprocessing capability of the Yongbyon facility. However, when one realistically considers that there must be a small reprocessing facility for testing before constructing a reprocessing facility of this scale, one can presume that a small reprocessing facility is hidden somewhere in North Korea. Even the IAEA, after its recent ad hoc inspections, has expressed strong concern about the existence of such a small facility.

Outside of this, North Korea is independently constructing a 200 megawatt-class power plant in Taechon and is operating several uranium mines and refining and processing facilities to supply nuclear fuel for its No. 1 and No. 2 atomic reactors. Additionally, through college-level atomic energy related programs established at places such as the Kim Il-sung University and the Kim Chaek Polytechnical Institute, many talented individuals are being produced and are staffing places like the Yongbyon and Pakchon atomic energy research centers.

North Korea Nuclear Facilities Current Status

	Scale		
Facility (Location)	**As Announced by the North**	**As Presumed by the South**	**Remarks**
Quasi-research Reactor (Pyongyang)*			Currently opnl?
Critical Mass Reactor (Yongbyon)			Currently opnl?
Critical Mass Reactor (Yongbyon)*	8MWt Research Reactor	8MWt Research/Generating Reactor	Opnl in 1965
Number 1 Atomic Reactor (Yongbyon)*	5MWe Generating Reactor	30MWt Research/Generating Reactor	Opnl in 1987
Number 2 Atomic Reactor (Yongbyon)*	50MEw Generating Reactor	200MWt Research/Generating Reactor	Scheduled Completion in 1995
Generating Reactor (Taechon)	200MWe Generating Reactor	200MWe Generating Reactor	Scheduled Completion in 1996
Generating Reactor, 3 Reactors (Sinpo)*	635MWe X3 Generating Reactors	Generating Reactor	In planning stages
Reprocessing Facility (Yongbyon)*	Radiation Chemistry	200t/y Reprocessor	Final stages
Uranium Enrichment (Pyongsan)*		extremely small amounts?	Mid-1980's?
Nuclear Fuel Facility (Yongbyon)*		200-300t/per year	1985-86
Uranium Refinement (Pyongsan)*		.03t/per day	Opnl '86
Uranium Refinement (Pakchon)*		?	Currently Opnl?
Uranium Mining Facilities (Kusong)		?	Currently Opnl?
Uranium Mines (Hongnam, Pyongsan, Ung-ki, Sunchon 2, etc.)*		Smelting capacity 26 million tons	
Atomic Power Science (Yongbyon)		2,000 member staff	Est. in '62, enlarged in '82
Pyongsong Atomic Power Research Center (Pyongsong)		5,000-6,000 Staff	Est '82
Pakchon Atomic Power Research Center (Pakchon)		?	Est ?
Nanam Atomic Power Research Center (Chongjin)		?	Est '82
Wonsan Atomic Power Research Center (Wonsan)		?	Est ?
Kim Il-song University College of Nuclear Physics (Pyongyang)			Est '82
Pyongsong Scientific University (Pyongsong)			Est '82
Kim Chaek Poly-Technical Institute College of Nuclear Physics (Kim Chaek)			Est ?

**Notes: *Facilities verified in first report issued to IAEA by North Korea on 4 May 1992; Est = Established; Opnl = Operational. Source: KIDA Nuclear Study Group

North Korea's nuclear development can be determined by the construction dates of its atomic reactors and reprocessing facilities. Since the Yongbyon reprocessing facility's exterior building was discovered in mid-1989, we can presume construction began in 1988; more important, a small testing reprocessing facility was completed a year or two ago.

Considering that construction of a small reprocessing facility takes three years and the time since the first research is about four years, it can be reasoned that North Korea has pursued the plan for reprocessing since the early 1980's. This time period coincides with the beginning of construction on the No. 1 atomic reactor-,which produces the spent fuel needed in North Korea's nuclear development. Therefore, North Korea began nuclear development at least by the end of the 1970s, and is it presumed that they established their nuclear development plan in the mid-1970's. Judging from this,

beginning in the 1980's North Korea has concentrated research and development only in fields related to nuclear development. We can see by their not going public outside of North Korea that they have expended their efforts to conduct this research and development unilaterally as much as possible without outside assistance.

Reprocessing Facilities That Must Be Taken Into Consideration

There are two approaches to nuclear development. One is the method that uses plutonium as a nuclear material, and the other is the method that uses highly enriched uranium. North Korea has been judged as primarily pursuing the method that uses plutonium. For that reason, North Korea has all sorts of facilities to produce the plutonium. Because it is presumed to be difficult to manufacture the amount of uranium needed for nuclear weapon manufacturing, the enriched uranium facilities are virtually all of test laboratory-grade.

Additionally, having already started the operation of the plutonium production reactor (the No. 1 atomic reactor), North Korea has stored the used spent fuel emitted from this reactor. The reprocessing facility is also in its final stages. In 1990 North Korea had produced several grams of plutonium in the partially operational facilities, which openly violates the Joint Declaration for a Nuclear Free Korean Peninsula. It is said that one cannot exclude the possibility of the operation of a hidden small-scale reprocessing facility.

What is most significant in North Korean nuclear facilities are the reprocessing facilities. Together with enrichment, reprocessing is the process that produces fission materials which become core materials in nuclear warheads. For example, uranium (U-235) can be extracted through enrichment, and plutonium can be extracted through reprocessing. Currently, if these facilities, whose buildings are 80 percent complete and whose interior equipment is 40 percent complete, become operational they will be able to produce enough plutonium for one or two nuclear warheads within a few months. Although not exposed, if a small-scale reprocessing facility that might have been completed before 1988 has been operational, there is the possibility that North Korea could have already secured sufficient quantities of plutonium to make three to six Nagasaki-class nuclear warheads.

Outside of North Korea's own production methods for nuclear materials, there is a possibility of their importing the materials from outside.

There is a report that in early 1992, North Korea smuggled 56 kg of plutonium from the Commonweallth of Independent States (CIS). If this is true, North Korea will be able to produce about 10 nuclear warheads by the beginning of 1993 and this will become a serious threat to the security of South Korea. The possibilities for smuggling expensive plutonium are great because the CIS has economic difficulties and a weakened ability to control the nation. It has now dismantled their existing nuclear weapons.

At the same time, in the event that North Korea has smuggled in magnetic separation equipment and centrifugal separators which were used by Iraq, they could also extract small amounts of uranium. This method requires, of course, much more time than the plutonium method, but they can use natural uranium from inside North Korea. They do not need any facilities or equipment outside of the separation equipment. The possibility that they have secretly done this is high.

When looking at the nuclear detonation tests which have been conducted since the mid-1980's and were halted after 1991, it can be concluded that North Korea has completed internal detonation development. It normally takes about 50 attempts to finish this kind of testing; North Korea has been estimated to have conducted about 70.

In general, the possibility is great that North Korea already has obtained sufficient plutonium. Since they have already developed explosive equipment, it is predicted that they have completed nuclear development or will complete it by the end of the year. Even though they say that they do not possess a reprocessing capability, there is a high possibility that they have hidden several tons of spent fuel extracted from the No. 1 reactor, and through this, they can extract plutonium from the small scale reprocessing facility that has probably been hidden at Yongbyon.

Pursuing Nuclear Development for Military Goals

There are three initial reasons for North Korea's development of atomic power: Political, military, and economic. Since atomic power is an important energy resource, there were likely economic objectives, hoping to make atomic energy development a driving force behind economic development after first obtaining the basic technology. Atomic power development is also applicable to the development of nuclear weapons, which yield incredible force. Their initial reasons likely included an intention to secure military superiority over the South through future nuclear weapons development. North Korea also likely regarded nuclear weapons as a lever that can flaunt its strength to neighboring countries with an interest in Northeast Asia, including South Korea, believing that they can lead the Third World. By using diplomatic power which has been established through these nuclear weapons, the North has attempted to weaken the South's international standing legitimizing the North Korean system.

North Korea has pursued nuclear development for exclusively military goals since June 1987, the deadline by which they should have signed the IAEA's Nuclear

Safeguards Accord, 18 months after becoming a signatory of the Nonproliferation Treaty in December 1985. Although North Korea started atomic development at the same time as South Korea, the reason the North does not have atomic power plants is because it has used atomic power operations for military purposes exclusively. In other words, because North Korea has used atomic power for military purposes, many key facilities with the exception of the No. 1 atomic reactor have not received IAEA nuclear inspection. The Sinpo atomic power plant, which was to be built with Soviet assistance in December 1985, is still as it originally was, without any progress since on-site construction operations were halted.

Some of the technologies and facilities accumulated during that time can be partially applied to basic sciences and engineering fields such as medicine, physics, and material engineering, and through this accumulation North Korea was able to extract small quantities of precious metals. In difficult economic circumstances like the current situtation, they were unable to make the most of extensive development in atomic power. The enormous power available from atomic power plants became a precious oasis to North Korea which has a insufficient amount of limited energy. If they had invested in economic recovery from the outrageous expenses of manpower, maintenance, research, and facilities expenses that were directly invested in nuclear development, North Korea would not be faced with a threat to their system caused by an economy like the one they have today.

We can see that today's North Korean nuclear development, although small, is not for an economic goal. North Korea's nuclear development goal is either to ensure military predominance on the Korean peninsula or to preserve their advantageous position in relations with the United States and Japan. It can be further surmised that their abandonment of nuclear development is for the sake of receiving simultaneous recognition of the North Korean system and the hereditary succession of power. With the recent deterioration of the North Korean economy, if their political goals are accomplished, North Korea will endeavor to first resolve their economic problems by receiving aid from the Western camp, including Japan, in order not to have their sovereignty taken away by South Korea. If this should happen, North Korea could establish stability in its system, economy, and diplomatic sectors. They could then create a situation in which they can competitively exist with South Korea.

If this occurs, there will be a need to closely look at the great influence North Korea's nuclear capability will have on international society, since the peripheral countries surrounding the Korean peninsula will have to recognize North Korea and its hereditary succession of power.

If North Korea is made to accept the nuclear inspections as planned, they will be forced to halt their nuclear development, and the concern about nuclear proliferation will be wiped out at once. Cessation of North Korea's nuclear development, as happened with Iraq, can provide a good example of how to block nuclear development in Second and Third World countries that are in a position similar to North Korea. Therefore, there will be a diminishing of Third World attempts at nuclear development and a strengthening of the international nuclear prohibition system. Because of this, there will be no particular change in the world order.

However, if North Korea rejects nuclear inspections or pursues nuclear development in hidden nuclear facilities, the possibility is high of an extremely unstable structural change in international society. With a nuclear imbalance arising on the Korean peninsula, and with Third World countries being provided an excuse for nuclear proliferation, nuclear proliferation will begin with the Korea peninsula and spread to Northeast Asia, the Middle East, and Africa.

Influence on International Society

North Korean nuclear development will have three types of influence on international society.

First, South Korea will face the problem of a nuclear imbalance on the Korean peninsula when North Korea has succeeded in nuclear development. In the Joint Declaration for a Nuclear Free Korea South Korea has already declared there are no U.S. nuclear weapons in the country; its position is not to develop nuclear weapons, but to use nuclear research only for peaceful goals. If the South uses nuclear research only for peaceful purposes, there will be an imbalance. One side will have both nuclear and conventional weapons while the other side will have only conventional weapons. Of course, the off-shore deterrence strategy based on U.S. Air Force and Navy assets deployed off the Korea peninsula still remains effective, but, at a minimum, the power vacuum will become severe on the Korean peninsula. Accordingly, plans to close this gap must be reconsidered, and policies concerning the North Korean nuclear threat must be made.

Second, North Korean nuclear capability give Japan an excuse to have nuclear arms. If North Korea possesses nuclear weapons, it will become a large threat to Japan, which is within range of these weapons. It is only natural that Japan, as an economic superpower, will secure military power to escape this threat. The passage of the recent United Nations Peacekeeping Operations bill is direct evidence of this type of confrontation using military power. There is a possibility that Japan will attempt to obtain nuclear weapons, the key elements to becoming a military superpower, using the North Korean nuclear threat as an excuse.

As an advanced atomic nation, Japan is accumulating an adequate quantity of nuclear materials domestically, and it actually has a supplemental production system. By the year 2004 Japan will produce about 14.9 tons of used and left over plutonium, the equivalent of about 3,000

Nagasaki-class nuclear warheads. Of course, these nuclear materials and production systems are used only for peaceful applications now, but if threatened by nuclear weapons from the outside or if an appropriate reason arises, Japan's nuclear potential can switch to military usage immediately.

Third, North Korea's nuclear development can influence nuclear proliferation in the Third World countries, which are on the threshold of becoming nuclear nations. Some nations, like Israel, do not publicize their possession of nuclear armaments, but the majority of nations, like Pakistan, Taiwan, the Republic of South Africa, and some nations in the Middle East, have restrictions in established nuclear prohibition policies and are merely unable to make nuclear weapons. Accordingly, North Korean nuclear development is a good excuse for the remaining Third World nations to pursue nuclear development. Nuclear superpowers, including the United States, are having trouble reasoning with these other nations.

If more nuclear proliferation occurs in Third World, established nuclear prohibitions will collapse. In this uncontrollable situation, these newly emerging nuclear nations will possess several dozen nuclear warheads in addition to other ballistic weapons. If this occurs, mutual deterrence through nuclear weapons can be achieved with a range of at least 1,000 km. As a result, even superpowers will not be able to ignore the small nuclear nations, thus leading to an era of nuclear wars. In other words, the established world order will collapse, and the international situation will be unstable.

IAEA Inspections and Mutual Inspections

It will not be easy for North Korea, who has pursued nuclear development since the mid-1970's, to abandon nuclear research once it has completed nuclear development. However, international sentiment is demanding that North Korea abandon its nuclear development and is using nuclear inspections as a means to this end. There are two ways to conduct the North Korean nuclear inspections, for which negotiations are currently in progress: inspections under the IAEA, and mutual inspections conducted by the interested parties in North and South Korea.

The IAEA inspection is also called the Full Nuclear Safeguards Accord under the stipulations of the NPT [Nonproliferation Treaty] signatories. For about four years North Korea, who signed the NPT in December 1985, has violated the provisions that state that signatories of the NPT must sign the accords within 18 months. They finally ratified the agreement 9 April 1992 after signing it on 30 January 1992, and received ad hoc inspections for two weeks starting 25 May 1992.

According to the agreement, based on "INFCIRC/153" of the IAEA document, all North Korean nuclear facilities now known can be included in the inspections. Actually, North Korea has reported 14 facilities, including four reactors. Because the ad hoc inspections, which were to confirm the details North Korea submitted about the nuclear facilities, are completed, there is a possibility that periodic inspections may be held within a month after the inspections. Periodic inspections mainly verify the amount of nuclear materials that are in either equipment or facilities. In other words, it is an investigation to see if the reports lied about the amount of nuclear materials and to check for the possibility of hoarded nuclear materials. Facilities or materials being inspected for the first time are sealed and surveillance cameras are set up. Thus, after the inspections, nuclear facilities that have been disclosed, such as the No. 1 reactor or the Yongbyon reprocessing facility, will be unable to be used for nonpeaceful purposes.

Differing from the IAEA inspections, mutual nuclear inspections between North and South Korea are being pursued under a nuclear inspection agreement based on the principle that it will independently resolve the problems of the Korean peoples. Mutual inspections are conducted according to agreements between the North and South. From a position that it can take successive steps, the forcefulness of these inspections is greater than the IAEA inspections. As this is based on the 31 December 1991 Joint Declaration for a Nuclear Free Korea, it can indicate situations that violate the denuclearization provisions and can lead to mutually agreed upon regulations. However, as forceful as it may be, until the agreement is finalized, there are other extremely laborious points.

The Joint Nuclear Control Commission, which guides this agreement, has held its fifth meeting, but they still cannot agree on the inspection regulations. North Korea insists on provisions that will resolve mutual doubt. They call for a North Korean inspection team of several thousand persons to inspect American bases in order to verify the withdrawal of American nuclear weapons from the Korean peninsula. However, because there are many problems with several thousand people conducting inspections at the same time, South Korea is proposing that all bases be open but that the inspections be divided into multiple sessions in order to limit the size of the teams.

In addition, South Korea emphasizes reciprocity concerning North Korea. That is, since North Korea's inspections of military facilities in South Korea will be of military intelligence value other than verifying nuclear weapons, South Korea is demanding the opening of North Korean military facilities in return. Of course, this is intended to confirm North Korea's military facilities that are capable of nuclear weaponry. North Korea is stubbornly refusing this kind of proposal and supports only an inspection plan that will be difficult to fulfill. Because the North and South have not yet been able to agree on the inspection regulations, the prediction is that mutual inspections will probably be late.

Since North Korea has already allowed IAEA ad hoc inspections, they will likely accommodate the relatively justifiable IAEA nuclear inspections on a regular basis.

However, they will probably try to postpone mutual inspections which, although lacking international justification, by agreement would be much more forceful.

Limitations of IAEA Inspections

North Korea has been holding and controlling two reins during all of this. These two reins are the IAEA nuclear inspections and the North-South mutual nuclear inspections. While pushing nuclear development, North Korea is removing the problems in their strategy toward the South by using these reins, and they intend to take needed advantages from the outside.

The IAEA inspections, the first of the reins, are believed to be accepted, but there remain many problem areas.

These so-called problem areas include North Korean actions that occurred before the inspection and the nuclear facilities and materials the North Koreans did not report. Because the nuclear inspections are based on the list of facilities submitted by North Korea and agreed to by the IAEA, it is extremely difficult, technically speaking, to discover false records of the amount of spent fuel from the No. 1 reactor. The reason for this is that the spent fuel at the No. 1 reactor is not introduced to North Korea from foreign nations but is mined raw ore from mines inside of North Korea. Thus, the inspection teams cannot estimate the amount produced, and they cannot fully understand the operational history of the reactor.

Finally, there is a great possibility that real evidence of spent fuel hidden by North Korea cannot be seized, because the majority of cases are dependent on the records North Korea has submitted. Moreover, without accurate information, it will be a case of not being able to demand inclusion of the nuclear facilities hidden within North Korea in the inspection considerations.

Also, another problem concerns the management of a nuclear facility that is probably being used for nuclear development. This place is the Yongbyon reprocessing facility. It is a testing facility and is thought to be used for developing a high-speed breeder reactor and for finding an independent solution to the spent fuel cycle. However, it will be about 2010 before the high-speed breeder reactor will be an atomic reactor that can be used commercially.

This is because even advanced nations are not able to completely solve the necessary technical aspects for a fast-speed breeder reactor. There must be at least 10 atomic power plants in operation for reprocessing in order to cycle spent fuel and North Korea does not have that many. It is not that there are not enough storage facilities to store spent fuel, it is that up until now storage for spent fuel has not been a problem. According to the photographic materials of North Korean nuclear facilities released this past 10 June 1992, there were wild rumors of spent fuel storage facilities for the No. 1 reactor. North Korea, therefore, has no need for operational facilities such as the Yongbyon reprocessing facility and other like facilities.

This is where the limitations of the IAEA become apparent. Because the IAEA reports inspection results only to the United Nations, they will reexamine reports and commission corrective measures within the IAEA governing body, or, in the case corrective measures are not accepted, only secondary sanctions through the United Nations' Security Council can be used. The possibility of realizing particularly the demand for abolishing reprocessing facilities, as an infringement of North Korea's property rights, is small. Because the IAEA inspections have no force, there are limits of succeeding measures based on inspection results.

As in the case of Iraq, the Security Council can be mobilized, but a lot of time and barriers must be overcome for destructive steps. If North Korea rejects the destruction of its reprocessing facilities, the United States would have to use military force to destroy the facilities. Considering the difficulties of using military force, the United States would have to open negotiations with North Korea. In order to secure a light-water reactor atomic power plant, they will have to receive the support of the West's technology and capital, receive recognition of the hereditary succession of power of the North Korean dictatorship, and demand the opening of relations with Japan and the United States. This is a chance to reap economic, diplomatic and political benefits, killing three birds with one stone.

Even if North Korea does this, the fact that North Korea can continue to safely guard hidden nuclear capabilities remains a threat to South Korea. Using the IAEA inspections, North Korea, who has completely hidden facilities and materials needed for nuclear development, will attempt to prove their transparency. There is a propensity for North Korea to misuse the limitations of the IAEA inspections on removing doubt concerning its nuclear development.

The second set of reins that North Korea holds is mutual North-South nuclear inspections. While it is an effective inspection tool, it lacks international justification compared to the IAEA inspections, and has the special characteristic of being an issue solely between the North and South. Because the mutual inspections are being pursued for the sake of realizing the Joint Declaration for a Nuclear Free Korea, its success or failure in a small way influences North Korea's position.

North Korea's refusal of mutual inspections, however, can be interpreted as indicating their intention to not abandon nuclear development, since they regard the mutual inspections as not enabling a real denuclearization. If the mutual nuclear inspections occur, the South might be able to locate nuclear facilities that were unable to be investigated under the IAEA inspections, and there is an advantage in being able to abolish the problem of the Yongbyon reprocessing facilities in accordance with the North-South agreement. If it turns out this way, the United States will be able to avoid forcibly destroying the facility by military force, and the North will have to give up many benefits. From this perspective, the United

States will support mutual nuclear inspections. The U.S. intention is to link North-South exchanges to the nuclear problem. Already this attitude is appearing from various fields such as limiting the exchanges between North Korea and Japan.

North Korea is using this set of reins militarily and politically against South Korea. For example, in order to promote mutual inspections, the South has been forced to abandon the economically and environmentally important enrichment and reprocessing through its having made the 8 November 1991 denuclearization proclamation. The North has also succeeded in securing the removal of U.S. nuclear weapons from the South. Through inspecting U.S. forces bases in the South for the sake of verifying the absence of nuclear weapons, they will be able to acquire military information. North Korea has up to now taken advantage of the nuclear issue in its relations with South Korea, and they will use the issue as a bargaining card in the future as well.

It is predicted that North Korea will exert great effort to keep South Korea from pulling the reins from them and it is thought that future North-South mutual nuclear inspection negotiations will have repeated rough sailing.

In the 6th round of the inter-Korean premiers talks, Kim Il-song personally denied North Korea's nuclear weapons development when meeting South Korean Prime Minister Chong Won-sik, and returned the nuclear negotiations to the starting point by suddenly demanding the withdrawal of the United States Forces in Korea [USFK]. In the recent Joint Nuclear Control Commission negotiations, they have virtually dragged the mutual doubt settlement principles settled thus far, which were difficult to settle, into a virtual breakdown in negotiations.

When it comes to mutual inspections, North Korea shows a slightly cooperative attitude concerning the nuclear inspections when it is in a weaker position. If they are in a more powerful position, however, they show an unreasonable two-faced attitude, as seen in the statements made by Kim Il-song at the sixth inter-Korean premiers talks.

A New Dimension Of Nuclear Policy Is Needed.

There is a need to scrutinize the U.S. attitude concerning obstructing North Korea's nuclear development. Their attitude is visible in various instances. Situations such as statements calling for military sanctions by the U.S. leadership, South Korean visits, and the recall of the South Korean ambassador from the United States lead to assumptions of rapid developments. If the situation continues to develop like this, South Korea will not be able to take any kind of measures concerning U.S. military actions in accordance with their indiscriminate nuclear prohibition policies. We will only be able to watch U.S.-North Korean actions. Prime Minister Chong Won-sik, of course, has already disclosed the "wrongfulness of military intervention caused by the nuclear problem." We must, however, not revive the tragedy of fratricidal war on the Korean peninsula.

In conclusion, since we are in agony over the North Korean nuclear problem, we must emphasize long-term national interests over short-term benefits. We must also ensure that the Korean peninsula is not neglected due to the nuclear prohibition policies of the nuclear superpowers.

This is an era in which we must remember early on the words "develop strength" as pointed out by Tosan [An, Chang-ho, a Korean independence freedom fighter]. Without strength, the security vacuum in regards to North Korea will be very difficult to fill. Even if unification is realized, we will not be able to block outside invasions—just like Tosan said.

South Korea does not have current measures capable of tackling the North Korean nuclear threat. Although there is a feeling of being slightly late, South Korea needs to make a nuclear policy with new dimensions. Through investments in atomic technologies, South Korea can resolve the energy savings problem facing Korea, and we must adopt a source of secure strength. We must refuse U.S. military sanctions toward the North; North Korea must refrain from nuclear activities that darken the future of our homogeneous race; and we must also resolutely see an attitude of harmonious exchanges on the basis of trust.

North Said Shifting Policy on Reunification

SK2509015992 Seoul THE KOREA TIMES in English 25 Sep 92 p 2

[Text] North Korea, being aware of changing realities in and around the Korean peninsula, is increasingly shifting from its unification policy based on a confederal system, Vice Unification Minister Yim Tong-won said yesterday.

In a keynote speech to a seminar on unification formula organized by the Central Consultative Council for National Unification, Yim said, "Thus far, North Korea has insisted that all problems between the South and North will be resolved once and for all only if political and military confrontation comes to an end.

"But now, the north has begun to recognize the necessity of promoting exchanges and cooperation, above all. This means a great change in the basic structure of its unification policy in which 'political unification' would precede integration of national communities," Yim said.

He divided the inter-Korean dialogue featured by premiers' talks which started two years ago into four phases. South and north Korea adopted auxiliary arrangements in various fields to carry out the Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression, and Exchanges and Cooperation, during the eighth round of premiers' talks in Pyongyang last week.

From now on, our government will undertake projects easier to carry out and beneficial to each side, said Yim, who concurrently serves as the southern-side chairman of the inter-Korean subcommittee on exchanges and cooperation.

He said that the inter-Korean dialogue has produced some tangible fruit in the course of eight rounds of premier talks in recent years.

Some 1,200 people from the South and North have visited the other side and more than 2,000 South Korean citizens have met their relatives and family members in third countries, including China, for the past two years.

Economic exchanges and cooperation which started in 1988 amounted to $400 million in two-way trade so far, and have been sharply increasing year by year. Now, South Korea is the North's fourth largest trading partner, Yim said.

"An invisible achievement more important than anything else is that the dialogue has brought some changes and openness in North Korea," he said.

First of all, he said that the government delegations from South and North have visited the other side of the divided peninsula and have come to recognize each other as dialogue partners.

The two sides could compare and assess each other through the exchanges of the large-scale delegations and, in particular, the north has come to realize the necessity for promoting economic exchanges and cooperation, he said.

He went on, "Both sides affirmed the legitimacy of a unification policy based on a gradual, phased approach rather than a radical and extreme one."

Burma

Envoy to Thailand Named Deputy Foreign Minister

BK2409110792 Rangoon Radio Burma in Burmese 0933 GMT 24 Sep 92

[Declaration No. 55/92 of the State Law and Order Restoration Council; dated 24 September 1992]

[Text] Appointment of deputy foreign minister: The State Law and Order Restoration Council [SLORC], has appointed U Nyunt Swe [ambassador to Thailand] as deputy minister of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

By the authority vested in me
Signed: Khin Nyunt, major general, secretary-1 of SLORC

SLORC Said Continuing Offensive on Manerplaw

BK2409145992 (Clandestine) Democratic Voice of Burma in Burmese 1430 GMT 23 Sep 92

[Station "article"]

[Text] Since January 1992, the State Law and Order Restoration Council [SLORC], a clique of facist dictators, has staged the ruthless Nagamin Operation, a daring military act, to capture Manerplaw camp in order to disengage itself from its political, economic, and diplomatic setbacks.

Three light infantry divisions, the air force, an artillery division, and special military commando units were involved in the operation. They had relentlessly planned to capture Manerplaw Camp by 27 March, but in reality they were unable to do so. Not only did they fail to capture Manerplaw Camp, but thousands of officers and soldiers were either killed or wounded. Their low morale worsened. They felt increasing antagonism from the public. They also lost many war weapons. Many soldiers were annihilated at (Lawtatut) and (Phi Pha-Oo) on 27 March. By the end of April they could neither go forward nor retreat and were also short of supplies. In that situation they had no other choice but to retreat as quickly as posiible.

At that momonent, Major General Maung Hla, chief of the forward military operations special control command, said in regard to national unity that all offensives in Karen State would be suspended. Later, the battered military units were withdrawn from the front line. Therefore, Maj. Gen. Maung Hla's announcement was to cover the SLORC's defeat and make political gains.

While the SLORC, a military clique, was saying pretentiously that it had suspended all offensives in Karen State, its troops were carrying out offensives in the western and southern combat zones of Manerplaw by employing three strategies, and in the northern part of Papun area by using two strategies. In places like Taungoo, Nyaunglebin, Shwegun, and Kyaukkyi the villagers were forcibly rounded up and enslaved. Thus, the announcement on the suspension of all offensives in the Karen State is totally untrue. The truth is, they are planning to carry out a surprise offensive in the coming (?dry season).

At present, SLORC is facing a more serious political, economic, and diplomatic crisis. It is planning a more brutal and audacious military act to capture Manerplaw to extricate itself from these crises. Moreover, Maj. Gen. Maung Hla, who faced shameful defeat in the Nagamin Operation last summer, came to Pa-an and held a secret meeting on military matters at the Zwegabin Hall in July 1992. At the meeting, all the commanders who participated in the (Ye Aung) Operation in 1977 to the present Nagamin Operation in 1992, were invited and military assesments were made. The recruitment and psychological warfare units are being sent to Irrawaddy, Pegu, Magwe, Sagaing, and Mandalay Division, and Chin, Kachin, and Arakan states where they have been forcibly conscripting new soldiers. From every town and village two to five soldiers have been recruited forcibly.

The soldiers are now waiting to evict, arrest, kill, and abduct the villagers as porters and are going to use them as minesweepers in the forthcoming dry season offensive in the Karen State. They are also planning to make women and children walk in front of military columns and are planning to use them to persuade the revolutionaries to surrender. They are even prepared to abduct thousands of people countrywide and use them as minesweepers. Thousands of people died in the battlefields under the brutality of SLORC's mercenaries during the Nagamin Operation, and the populace is now facing great hardships. This time, too, the facists are preparing to wage a more brutal and ferocious offensive. There is a great possibility that thousands of people could be killed and millions inflicted with pain and suffering.

All these things are due to the manipulations of SLORC, a clique of facist dictators, which hopes through them to hang onto power a little longer. As long as the SLORC is in power the whole nation will be in deep trouble. Therefore, the entire public, including all the national races, must oppose the SLORC's deceitful acts and continue the struggle until the facist and militaristic rule of the SLORC is wiped out.

New Rebel Group Said Operating Near Thai Border

BK2309012592 Bangkok BANGKOK POST in English 23 Sep 92 p 2

[Text] A little-known Burmese rebel group is believed to be responsible for ambushing a Border Patrol Police [BPP] scout unit near the Burmese border in August, anti-Rangoon rebel sources told the BANGKOK POST yesterday.

Five Border Patrol Police scouts died in the ambush while four survivors were rescued after roaming in the jungle for over one month.

The sources identified the group as the Democratic Patriotic Army (DPA) which was formed by former members of the Burmese Communist Party (BCP) under the leadership of Saw Han.

The DPA has about 400 armed troopers operating in the southern part of Burma, especially in the coastal areas of Tavoy and Mergui. They allegedly tax Thai fishermen who operate in Burmese territorial waters.

Sources claimed that Maj Soe Lwin, a member of the DPA, might be responsible for the ambush which killed five BPP scouts. Soe Lwin's gang has been operating in Burma opposite Phetchaburi and Ratchaburi provinces for over two decades.

Five of the nine-man team sent to the Thai-Burmese border in Kaeng Krachan District of Phetchaburi Province last month were killed in the ambush. The rest eluded capture at the hands of the rebels by hiding in the jungle.

Unlike the Karen National Union or the New Mon State Party, sources said the DPA was quite reclusive. They have not made contact with the Thai authorities nor would they allow any strangers to venture into their territory, the sources added.

After the collapse of the BCP and the surrender of its leader, Ba Thein Tin, to Chinese authorities in China in April 1989, Saw Han and his men refused to give up their armed struggle and started its own crusade.

There are about 30 DPA men in Kaeng Krachan who have influence over local Karens in the Bilauk Taung Range, which is also known as the Great Tenasserim.

Sources told the BANGKOK POST that the same area also served as a sanctuary for Thai communists during the '70s.

The place also serves as a haven for runaway Thai criminals.

To attain self-sufficiency and self-support, sources claimed that the DPA men cultivate marijuana and trade in the drug with Thai traffickers in order to get hard cash to buy arms to protect themselves against outside encroachers.

Karen rebel sources said their men normally do not engage in gun battles with the DPA fighters when they meet because they regard Rangoon forces as their common enemy.

They said even Burmese forces were unable to trespass on the DPA's territory.

A former governor of KNU [Karen National Union] in charge of Tavoy and Mergui districts of Burma, Col Marvel, once offered to crack down on the DPA provided that the Thai military attack the rebel group if it crossed the border into Thailand, said the sources, adding that this was turned down by then army chief Gen Chawalit Yongchaiyuth.

The sources also doubted that the suppression drive launched by the Thai BPP in retaliation for the killing of its men would bear fruit because the DPA rebels will retreat into Burma and return once the suppression operation is over.

The blocking of all exit routes will also be costly and would require the deployment of a large number of troops, the sources noted.

A member of the BPP scout team who survived the harrowing ordeal, Pol Sgt Arun Klinkun, also admitted that he saw no way that the DPA rebels could be forcibly removed from their strongholds in Thailand.

Speaking from his hospital bed in Prachuap Khiri Khan, he said the rebel group had enough food and was self supporting.

Besides, he said very little information has been obtained about the group.

Cambodia

Khieu Samphan Explains Opposition to Logging Ban

BK2509030892 (Clandestine) Voice of the Great National Union Front of Cambodia in Cambodian 2330 GMT 24 Sep 92

[Text] The issue of natural resources exploitation, including logging, was raised at a meeting of the Supreme National Council [SNC] in Phnom Penh on 22 September. On this issue, His Excellency Khieu Samphan had the following remarks:

Before discussing the technical committee's report on the exploitation of natural resources, the Party of Democratic Kampuchea [PDK] wishes to point out that we did not participate in the drafting of the proposal on 14 September 1992. So we would like to express our opinion on the drafted proposal as follows:

1. The fifth paragraph of the proposal's preamble says assistance programs or other foreign aid could be used to offset the loss of income from logging exportation, and the sixth paragraph claims that the income from logging exportation could be used to affect a neutral political climate.

The essence of the two paragraphs would be correct if Cambodia were an integrally unified country or under the control of SNC to some extent. With the current Cambodian situation, however, where each party is in exclusive control of its region, should the two paragraphs be implemented, intentionally or unintentionally, this would concretely and certainly mean penalizing one party while favoring another party.

2. The draft proposal calls on the four Cambodian parties' administrations to step up efforts to implement the measures mentioned in the document:

A. The call is against the spirit and essence of the Paris accord. It is worth noting that the accord does not talk about the administrations, but the existing administrative structure of each party under the control and supervision enforced by UNTAC [United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia] in close cooperation with the SNC.

B. The call, intentionally or unintentionally, constitutes a way to reduce the SNC's role while bolstering the role of each party, and concretely, the role of the Phnom Penh faction in implementing the important clause on the SNC role of the Paris accord.

As such, in concrete application, the call is ineffective despite the control and supervision enforced by UNTAC without the participation of the four parties. The Phnom Penh side and Yuon [derogative term for Vietnamese] will then continue to control the logging.

3. In sum, if the draft proposal were implemented, this would concretely constitute a means or a measure to punish Democratic Kampuchea, thereby allowing the Phnom Penh side and Yuon to act at will.

4. For the aforementioned reasons it is necessary to enhance the role of SNC to allow it, as the sole legitimate body, to collaborate with UNTAC to control and make the exploitation of forest and other natural resources as well as other aspects of the application of the Paris accord effective.

5. In a situation where the SNC has not yet had any concrete role, the measures in the draft proposal as well as all other measures, although they are introduced with whatever good intention, will be not only ineffective but will also provide the Phnom Penh faction with exclusive right to act at will while penalizing the other parties, specifically PDK.

Therefore, for the reasons cited above, PDK has to reluctantly oppose the draft proposal.

Ranariddh Interviewed on 10 Sep SNC Meeting

BK2409130192 (Clandestine) Voice of the Khmer in Cambodian 0430 GMT 24 Sep 92

["Recent" interview with Prince Norodom Ranariddh, party chairman of the National United Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful, and Cooperative Cambodia (FUNCINPEC), by FUNCINPEC radio correspondent; date, place of interview not given—recorded]

[Text] [Correspondent] I, a correspondent of FUNCINPEC [National United Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful, and Cooperative Cambodia] Radio, humbly greet His Royal Highness [HRH] Prince Norodom Ranariddh, chairman of the FUNCINPEC Party and member of Cambodia's Supreme National Council [SNC]. First of all, I ask your permission to pose the following question: The SNC meeting in Siem Reap town on 10 September raised a number of issues for discussion and agreed on several of them, including the draft of the new constitution for the future government formed after the 1993 elections. Please describe this draft constitution to the Cambodian people and tell them how democratic it will be.

[Ranariddh] To your first question, I want first of all to stress that the meeting of the SNC and the UN Transitional Authority for Cambodia, UNTAC, in Siem Reap town on 10 September under the august chairmanship of our venerated Prince Father and in the presence of Mr. Yasushi Akashi, was of unfathomable significance if we take into consideration the issues settled there. I am not going to anwer your question about the constitution right away.

I would like to tell you that one important issue was raised by His Excellency [H.E.] Son Sann when he proposed that all factions should hand over real powers to HRH the Prince Father right now, pending the general elections, through a referendum by the people, who are the masters of the country, so they can choose the president of Cambodia. On that occasion, I, Norodom Ranariddh, voiced full, unconditional support for this most correct proposal of H.E. Son Sann. I then informed HRH the Prince Father and the rest of the meeting in these terms: the four Cambodian factions, the legitimate members of the SNC, have already agreed with one another to accept HRH the Prince Father as the august head of state of Cambodia. Therefore, it is only correct that all factions loyal to their commitment to the nation should hand over full state powers to the prince.

I also stressed that because in the past as in the future only HRH the Prince Father—in his capacity as the august father of the nation, father of national reconciliation, father of national peace, father of national independence, and so on—can reconcile all Cambodians from all tendencies and factions. On behalf of the FUNCINPEC Party, I support the proposal of H.E. Son Sann. I cited all the points I have just related to you as the basis for my support.

We must not have one or two simultaneous heads of state, puppet heads of state, and so on. We have recognized the belief of the four factions. It has been repeatedly proclaimed that we support the royal candidacy of HRH the Prince Father in a future universal election to select the president or head of state before handing over powers to the prince. Concerning this election, we would like to stress that the FUNCINPEC faction has made it clear that a universal presidential election should be held by all Cambodians before the legislative election or, at the latest, concurrently with the legislative election to be organized by the United Nations in May 1993. This is because Cambodia in the transitional period, before deciding on its new constitution, needs a head of state. And I fully believe that in a free election, HRH our Prince Father will surely win at least 90 percent of the

votes to be Cambodia's head of state. He will then be empowered to reconcile all Cambodians to accept the [words indistinct] and to approve the constitution worked out by a constituent assembly expressing the free will of our people.

The Phnom Penh faction has already endorsed this position and so has the faction of H.E. Son Sann. And it is also supported by the Party of Democratic Kampuchea [PDK], which has raised only two arguments: How can the election be held if the Vietnamese are everywhere in the country? How can it be held if there is no so-called neutral political atmosphere? Besides these arguments, it supported the candidacy of the prince. Since we all agree on this matter, then why don't we just hand over the powers to the prince right away?

After I had made my statement, H.E. Khieu Samphan asked to speak out, and he voiced his support for H.E. Son Sann's proposal and also for my views. This does not mean that I and the Khmer Rouge were in cahoots with each other. We agreed merely because H.E. Son Sann's proposal and my stated position were correct. Thus, H.E. Khieu Samphan, on behalf of the PDK, supported the proposal. It was, however, astounding to see that none of the six members from the Phnom Penh faction made any statement in support of H.E. Son Sann's proposal. This is a point that all of us should note. All venerable monks and beloved grandmothers, grandfathers, uncles, and aunts are invited to think this over and make up their minds.

I would like to end my remarks on this very significant point: None of the six persons said anything. A considerable time passed before HRH the Prince Father answered. He said: Thank you, H.E. Son Sann. Thank you, HRH Prince Norodom Ranariddh and H.E. Khieu Samphan. However, I cannot accept. First, I am too old. Second, certain factions—he did not specify which ones—still cherish their powers and want to cling to power. They do not wish to relinquish them to me. I can only thank you for making this important proposal.

Concerning the issue of the draft constitution raised in your first question, I would like to stress that three of our factions, namely, H.E. Son Sann, the Phnom Penh faction, and FUNCINPEC—I do not remember what argument the PDK made against it—as well as HRH the Prince Father, accepted all the ideas put forward by Mr. Yasushi Akashi concerning the draft constitution of Cambodia. H.E. Son Sann and I only made clear that in Paris in July 1989 HRH the Prince Father, H.E. Son Sann, and H.E. Khieu Samphan had already decided to work out a draft constitution.

That draft constitution, in its general form, was similar to that of the Fifth French Republic. First, there will be a head of state chosen in a universal election by the Cambodian people throughout the country; and second, there will be two assemblies, the National Assembly and the senate. This constitution advocates a very progressive and modern democracy and upholds universal human rights as defined in its preamble. This constitution, if approved, will have a very modern democratic character as a guarantee for the freedom of Cambodian citizens in general and also for the so-called game of democratic politics in line with modern countries, such as France.

Moreover, the UNTAC-proposed draft also looks correct to us. If the two drafts are merged together, it will be very possible for Cambodia to have guarantees on human rights as well as freedom in its political activities. Moreover, if all factions respect such a constitution, Cambodia will surely become a modern country truly adhering to liberal democracy. It will not be one that professes liberal democracy in name only, while in practice continuing to oppress the people under communist-style liberal democracy.

I would like to stress to you and to all grandmothers, grandfathers, uncles, and aunts—the radio's dear listeners—that the UN proposal is only a draft, for the final decision rests in the constituent assembly to be born out of the free election that will be organized in May 1993. However, in making that proposal, Mr. Akashi said he was afraid that just three months would not be enough time for the National Assembly. Therefore, if the four factions have already accepted the draft, the constituent assembly will surely be able within three months to adopt a very modern liberal democratic constitution for Cambodia, which will be the sole guarantee for the future of Cambodia.

[Correspondent] Thank you, highness. Second question: Will the elections in Cambodia take place as scheduled in May 1992 if the Khmer Rouge refuse to join the elections?

[Ranariddh] Concerning this extremely important issue, I, Norodom Ranariddh, have identical views with HRH the Prince Father. His view is as follows: First, we must hold elections in May 1993 at all costs. The United Nations has not yet made any final statement on this. It still hopes that the PDK [Party of Democratic Kampuchea], or Khmer Rouge as you call them, will agree to join the peace process toward free elections to be organized by the United Nations.

HRH the Prince Father has said: If elections were held in 85 percent of Cambodia's territory with a turnout of 85 percent of the voters, it would be a miracle. Do not forget that in France and other countries there has never been more than a 60 percent voter turnout. In these large countries, it is rare to see a turnout of more than 60 percent. Does it mean that the results of elections held in such a way are unacceptable? This is freedom, democratic freedom. If the Khmer Rouge say they do no want to join the elections and if the people say they prefer going fishing, then they are free to do so. That is called democratic freedom. Some Cambodians will say they do not want to vote, and they can do so because it is a

democracy. And yet, we will get perhaps an 85 percent turnout. But I have confidence in the Cambodian people throughout the country.

The prince understands that the election is the sole guarantee for the future of Cambodia. He [words indistinct]. If some do not turn out, they will be making a decision that accords with democracy. Do not forget that France and the United States have never achieved a 100-percent voter turnout. Sometimes there was a 40 percent turnout only. Do you call that undemocratic? In Cambodia we project that at least we will achieve a more than 80 percent turnout. What, then, will the PDK think of that?

Second, let us talk about the Vietnamese residents issue. In Paris, I, Norodom Ranariddh, emphasized that we know very well of the presence of disguised Vietnamese troops within the ranks of the Phnom Penh Army and of the presence of illegal Vietnamese nationals. FUNCINPEC is also worried. The PDK and the faction of H.E. Son Sann are not the only ones to be worried and to think about these problems. FUNCINPEC also is and does. However, for FUNCINPEC it is important to know when to resolve these two problems. We should resolve them when we regroup forces in cantonment sites.

Concerning the Vietnamese troop presence, if the Khmer Rouge also want to be regrouped, why have they been so loud in their intransigence? We can just regroup everyone and the hidden Vietnamese troops will also be regrouped. No one will be outside. We have proposed that quadripartite observers be assigned to UNTAC to inspect the troop cantonment areas and finger anyone who is not Cambodian. Our intention is to help UNTAC identify disguised Vietnamese soldiers. [Words indistinct] I remember, it was in Division No. 16. We even uncovered a Vietnamese captain.

The problem is that the Khmer Rouge just refuse to be regrouped in cantonments. In my opinion, all should be regrouped in the cantonment sites, and in the process we would be able to identify the disguised Vietnamese troops. [Words indistinct] it is why we insist on being regrouped in order to corner the Vietnamese in the cantonment sites. [Words indistinct] this is the opinion of FUNCINPEC and this is why FUNCINPEC has agreed to be regrouped in cantonment areas. People charge that FUNCINPEC has meekly agreed to be regrouped and never thought of the Vietnamese military presence. Am I right or am I wrong in saying so?

[Words indistinct] illegal Vietnamese residents. FUNCINPEC repeatedly protested this issue. We asked that it be excluded from the electoral law. At first it was written: Any person who is 18 years... We protested and got it changed to Cambodians who are... At least there is the mention of Cambodians. Still, the PDK said it was not enough. I said that if that was not enough, the PDK must stop opposing the elections and instead join UNTAC [words indistinct] when they announce the registration of Cambodian voters. Each party should send a representative—a representative each from the Khmer Rouge, the State of Cambodia, FUNCINPEC, the party of Mr. Sak Sutsakhan, and the many other parties, a total of about 16 parties. Each should be assigned to help UNTAC identify Vietnamese and non-Vietnamese. Are the 16 Cambodian parties unable to help UNTAC do that? Why do the Khmer Rouge so love creating obstacles?

So the troop regroupment is a solution to the problem of the Vietnamese military presence. [Words indistinct] in the voter registration is another way to help screen the illegal Vietnamese residents.

On the last topic, allow me to tell you that if FUNCINPEC wins the elections—if you vote for us—I promise that the FUNCINPEC government will settle this Vietnamese residents question properly in accordance with international law. We must never use any savage law because we need harmony and peace with our neighbors: Vietnam to the east with a population of 67 million people, and the Kingdom of Thailand to the west with 57 million. We must therefore settle all problems in accordance with international law and practice.

Speaking about the elections in 1993, HRH the Prince Father said the elections must be held. Furthermore, he said the PDK must be left outside the national community. We must go ahead and hold the elections wherever we can. [passage indistinct]

[Correspondent] Concerning Cambodia's frontier, what can be done to ensure that it is not violated?

[Ranariddh] This third issue has been discussed within the framework of the SNC and UNTAC meeting in Siem Reap town on 10 September. H.E. Son Sann once proposed the creation of [word indistinct] commission to study this problem.

On this topic I would like to make an observation with the following highlights:

1. The FUNCINPEC Party is a patriotic movement whose people have bled much within the framework of the Sihanoukist National Army, as well as that of the National Army of Independent Cambodia. FUNCINPEC, a purely Sihanoukist movement, does not allow anyone to violate or grab even the smallest portion of Cambodia's territory.

On this occasion, I would like to stress, for the information of all venerable monks and compatriots, that we are now entering the last part of the 20th century. While the United Nations has helped Kuwait attack and drive Iraq from Kuwaiti territory, we are still losing much of ours. We have lost many of our provinces in Kampuchea Kraom in the east and some in the west. We do not ask for anything, but on the passage from the 20th to the 21th century we only desire that no one seize any more

Cambodian territory. We would like to stress, however, that it is natural that bigger foreign countries want to grab our land.

One thing that hurts me, Norodom Ranariddh, most of all is that our fellow Cambodians are the ones who have offered our territory to others. It is natural that foreigners want our land; we must not blame them for that. But we, the Cambodians, including some from the royal family, who claimed to be patriots gave away land in the east and in the west. I have precise evidence of that, and that hurts me more than anything else. I do not blame the foreigners; it is my own blood, my own race, my own people. Therefore, the election in May 1993 will not be just a worthless game of democratic politics, it will be a matter of life or death for our nation.

I would like to avail myself of this opportunity to most humbly request the grandmothers, grandfathers, uncles, and aunts to consider this: If in 1993 you vote for any regime, any party known to have betrayed the nation, to have slaughtered the people, will it help solve the vital issue of our nation once it wins the election? This is my only request.

[Passage indistinct] this is a social game, not a democratic one. The territorial issue is a matter of the survival of the nation. Consequently, the FUNCINPEC Party pledges never to lose the land.

2. The FUNCINPEC Party will resolutely not [words indistinct]. Will we attack anyone who steals our land? No. Let me tell you this: The countries around us have signed the 23 October accords and committed themselves to respect Cambodia's sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity. In a provision of the accords, it was stipulated that all treaties and agreements signed by any Cambodian faction with a foreign country that affect the independence and territorial integrity of Cambodia shall be considered null and void. You need only implement this provision in order to settle a lot of problems.

Moreover, we have many other documents, such as the treaty by the Viet Cong and the Viet Minh in Hanoi, recognizing Cambodian territory. And now the Viet Minh are in control of all of Vietnam. They signed a commitment with our Prince Father in 1963 and promised to recognize it in 1970 in Phnom Penh. [Words indistinct] the FUNCINPEC government will settle the territorial problems again.

During the SNC meeting in Siem Reap town on 10 September, FUNCINPEC fully supported the proposal to set up the technical advisory commission to oversee the maritime frontier. FUNCINPEC—that is, I, Norodom Ranariddh—stressed our position as follows: This commission must not have any assignment other than examining the Cambodian frontier as defined on the 1:50,000 scale map prepared and published by the U.S. Defense Mapping Agency and recognized by our Khmer Royal Armed Forces in 1966. A special point: I stressed that I need not negotiate with anyone. [passage indistinct]

First Japanese Engineering Troops Arrive

OW2509035492 Tokyo KYODO in English 0334 GMT 25 Sep 92

[Excerpt] Phnom Penh, Sept. 25 KYODO—The first advance mission of Japan's Self-Defense Forces engineering troops arrived in Cambodia on Friday [25 September] morning to take part in United Nations peacekeeping operations.

Part of the 12-member group led by Lt. Col. Takashi Watanabe, traveling on a C-130 transport aircraft, landed on Pochentong Airport in the suburbs of the capital at 10 A.M. The remaining members will reach Phnom Penh on two C-130 airplanes later Friday.

The 12-member team stopped over at Naha, Okinawa Prefecture, and Thailand after departing the Air Self-Defense Force's Komaki Base in Aichi Prefecture on Wednesday.

The group will make preparations for the planned arrival of the main Japanese engineering troops in mid-October, coordinate with the U.N. Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), and make necessary arrangements for a mission to repair national roads Nos. 2 and 3. It will also work out details on billets for Japanese peacekeepers scheduled to be set up around Takeo, south of Phnom Penh, and plans on assembling and transporting machinery and materials soon to be unloaded at Kompong Som Port. [passage omitted]

Sihanouk Hosts Banquet for PRC Minister Xu

BK2509035292 Phnom Penh Samleng Pracheachon Kampuchea Radio Network in Cambodian 1300 GMT 24 Sep 92

[Text] His Royal Highness [HRH] Prince Norodom Sihanouk, Cambodia's head of state, father of the nation, and chairman of the Supreme National Council [SNC], and his wife hosted a banquet for a PRC Foreign Ministry delegation on its visit to Cambodia on the afternoon of 22 September at the Khemarin Palace.

Also attending the banquet were His Excellency [H.E.] General Tie Banh, vice chairman of the Council of Ministers, minister of National Defense, and SNC member from the State of Cambodia [SOC]; H.E. Dit Munti, minister of Information and Press and SNC member from the SOC; H.E. General Sin Sen, deputy minister of National Security and SNC member from the SOC; and representatives of the other Cambodian groups.

HRH Prince Norodom Sihanouk warmly welcomed the PRC Foreign Ministry delegation, saying that its visit constituted an encouragement to the implementation of the Paris peace agreement.

The prince also spoke on recent achievements in Cambodia's national construction, such as hospitals, schools,

roads, dams, and markets, which are proof of the Cambodian people's unity in national construction.

HRH Prince Norodom Sihanouk also extended best wishes to the Chinese Foreign Ministry delegation. He wished that Cambodian-Chinese solidarity last forever.

H.E. Xu Dunxin, Chinese deputy foreign minister, highly valued HRH Prince Norodom Sihanouk's wise leadership in national reconciliation and construction and wished the prince and his wife a long life so as to be the cool shade for the Cambodian people in the search for a genuine peace.

UK Minister of State Meets Sihanouk 22 Sep

BK2509034492 Phnom Penh Samleng Pracheachon Kampuchea Radio Network in Cambodian 1300 GMT 24 Sep 92

[Text] On the morning of 22 September at the Khemarin Palace, His Royal Highness [HRH] Prince Norodom Sihanouk, Cambodia's head of state, father of the nation, and chairman of the Supreme National Council, granted an audience to a delegation of the United Kingdom led by His Excellency [H.E.] Alistair Goodlad, UK minister of state for foreign affairs.

HRH Prince Norodom Sihanouk warmly welcomed the UK Foreign Ministry delegation, which is visiting Cambodia at a time when the Cambodian people are jointly implementing the Paris agreement.

The prince head of state also expressed profound thanks to and highly valued the UK's efforts in helping to promote the implementation of the agreement to achieve its goal in a timely manner, thus bringing peace to the Cambodian motherland.

H.E. Alistair Goodlad informed the prince head of state about the outcome of his visit to the State of Cambodia in which he saw the all-around development of the Cambodian people.

The UK minister of state also expressed his firm belief that under the wise leadership of the prince head of state, the Cambodian people will certainly achieve peace within the near future.

Meets Chea Sim

BK2509063092 Phnom Penh SPK in French 0400 GMT 25 Sep 92

[Text] Phnom Penh 25 Sep (SPK)—Chea Sim, chairman of the Cambodian People's Party Central Committee and National Assembly, held talks with a delegation from the British Foreign Ministry led by its Minister of State Alastair Goodlad in Phnom Penh on 23 September. The Cambodian leader briefed his guest on the current situation in the country and the efforts made by the State of Cambodia [SOC] in implementation of the Paris accord in active cooperation with the UN peacekeeping forces.

Chea Sim underlined that SOC staunchly supports Prince Sihanouk's candidacy for the post of head of state and that he wanted to organize the presidential election prior to the legislative elections.

On the issue of general elections scheduled for next year, Chea Sim made an appeal to the Khmer Rouge to participate with a view to reestablishing a genuine peace in Cambodia.

Chea Sim profoundly thanked the United Kingdom for its contributions to the application of the Paris accord so as to bring about peace for the Cambodian people.

Alastair Goodlad, in his reply, said he firmly believed that thanks to SOC's efforts in the implementation of the accord and under the leadership of Prince Norodom Sihanouk, Cambodia would recover peace soon.

The British Foreign Ministry's delegation left Phnom Penh on the same day after ending an official visit of five days here.

During its stay in Cambodia, the delegation was also received by Prince Norodom Sihanouk, head of state and SNC chairman, and Hun Sen, chairman of the Council of Ministers.

Indonesia

Suharto Urges Expanded UN Security Council

BK2409154192 Jakarta ANTARA in English 1248 GMT 24 Sep 92

[Text] New York, Sept 24 (OANA-ANTARA)—President Suharto, speaking as the chairman of the Nonaligned Movement [NAM] before the general debate of the 47th United Nations General Assembly [UNGA], here Thursday called for the expansion of the membership of the UN Security Council [UNSC] and the constructive review of the ways the veto power in the council is applied, in a bid to make the world body more democratic.

The president, speaking for 30 minutes, presenting the results of the 10th NAM summit in Jakarta early this month, said the NAM urges the UN to also reflect the principle of democracy in the forms of justice, equality, and openness in the representation of membership as well as in the process of making decisions.

The NAM is aware that the review of the UNSC membership has to be done carefully because it concerns a fundamental aspect of the objective and function of the organisation, he said.

If to the new UNSC members no veto right is to be granted, at least they could be given the status of permanent members. The entry of these nations as permanent members of the UNSC has to be based on relevant criteria that reflect the real world condition more faithfully, the president said.

The criteria, he added, should take into consideration the wider concept of security, that now has to take into account economic and social aspects, in addition to the military aspect.

The fact is that the economic policies of the industrial countries and the economic weight of the developing countries, particularly those with big populations, also affect world peace and international security in the same way as military might, he said.

He urged the UN to consider the struggles of nations in carrying out national development.

The world is now living in a development era where economic strength becomes more decisive. Millions of people in the developing countries are demanding their right to realize their economic and social potentials, the president said.

The NAM, he pointed out, is determined to play an active and constructive role in the effort to revitalise, restructure, and democratize the UN system. For this purpose the NAM has resolved to form a working group at a high level charged with the task of formulating concrete proposals for the restructuring of the UN, the president stated.

The NAM is determined to take part in developing a new world order that is free from war and poverty, intolerance and injustice. That is based on the principle of peaceful coexistence and true mutual dependence. That fully respect the variety of social and cultural systems in the world, the president said, who in the debate represented not 180 million Indonesians but also the NAM that consists of 108 member countries covering almost two-thirds of the UNGA membership.

Concerning human rights, President Suharto quoted the Jakarta Message, one of the products of the NAM Jakarta summit, which emphasises that human right applies universally, despite the fact that no one country has the right to use power to dictate its concept of democracy or its views on human rights on other countries, or to force them as conditionalities on other nations.

The president pointed out that the change in the economic system of central and east Europe and the formation of strong economic groups by the advanced countries tended to shift the world attention from overcoming poverty in various developing countries and to harm trade and its growth prospect.

In this connection, he cited the unsmooth run of the Uruguay Round, and called on the North and the South countries to create a new agreement on development and to develop democratic relationship in formulating the settlement of global problems.

Constructive dialogue between the North and the South must be based on real interdependent norms as well as common interests and responsibility.

The developing countries, according to the president, are facing heavy obstacles because of unfavourable external economic and environmental factors as reflected by the difficulty to get access of technology, protectionism, as well as the low price of commodities and raw materials.

He emphasized the need to make different approaches to write off the external debts of the less developed countries and to implement soft terms for the repayment of external debts by the developing countries.

NAM, which warmly welcomes the Rio conference's results, believes that environment and development problems cannot be separated and both should be addressed simultaneously, comprehensively, and fairly.

Efforts to implement the sustainable development program, which is environmentally friendly, require a global partnership that pays more attention to the need of developing countries for additional funds to tackle environmental problems and the access to the environmentally friendly technology, said Indonesia's President Suharto, the chairman of NAM for 1992-1995.

He welcomes the formation of a high commission on sustainable development as a new institution of the United Nations to implement the Rio conference's declaration.

Some 15 speakers, including New Zealand Prime Minister, and the heads of state of Bulgaria and Slovenia, were scheduled to present their speeches during a general debate on Thursday.

Philippines

Ramos Criticizes Continuing Communist Struggle

HK2509061992 Quezon City ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation DZMM in Tagalog 0400 GMT 25 Sep 92

[Text] President Fidel Ramos has strongly criticized Satur Ocampo, leader of the National Democratic Front, for reportedly stating that the communist movement would continue with its armed struggle. He said it was disappointing that the communist movement continues to make such comments despite his administration's efforts to achieve peace, even to the extent of granting amnesty to the rebels.

The president made the criticism during a meeting with mayors and other local officials from Pangasinan.

Ramos called on the local officials to form civilian groups to urge New People's Army regulars to come down from the hills and avail of the government's amnesty. He said the government is prepared to give more concessions to the rebels if responses from the country's various rebel groups continue to be favorable. He stressed that communism in the country, as well as abroad, is now on the decline.

Ramos Pardons Communist Leader, Releases 7 Rebels

HK2409141092 Manila Manila Broadcasting Company DZRH in Tagalog 0800 GMT 24 Sep 92

[Text] President Fidel Ramos today gave an absolute pardon to a top official of the Communist Party of the Philippines. Given the pardon was Rodolfo Salas, alias Commander Bilog. Ramos said Salas is scheduled to be released on 28 September, six years after he was arrested. The granting of a pardon to Salas is part of the government's reconciliation and peace initiatives.

At the same time, the president also announced the temporary release of seven military rebels. They are Lieutenant Colonel Rafael Galvez, First Lieutenant Orlando Cabaliegan, Staff Sergeants Domingo Cuenco and Benjamin Asuncion, and Privates First Class Augusto Borbe, Leopoldo Runi and Berlin Mabalot. They were considered least culpable in the violation of the Articles of War.

Ramos Approves Auxiliary Police Force

HK2509022492 Manila DWIZ Voice of the Filipino People's Radio in Tagalog 2200 GMT 24 Sep 92

[Text] President Fidel V. Ramos has approved the Auxiliary Police Force [APF] program in four cities and three municipalities in Metro Manila. The program was approved by the president based on recommendations made by the Department of Interior and Local Government, where the APF will be under the jurisdiction of the Philippine National Police [PNP]. The move was made in order to allay fears that some mayors might use the APF as a private army.

The primary administrative role of the APF is to enforce PNP rules. Its members will undergo psychological testing before being allowed to carry firearms.

Abadia Says Militia Unit Not To Be Abolished

HK2409140992 Manila DZXL Radio Mindanao Network in Tagalog 0700 GMT 24 Sep 92

[Text] Armed Forces chief Lisandro Abadia said it is not yet time to abolish the Citizen's Armed Forces Geographical Unit [CAFGU]. However, he confirmed that the number of CAFGU members will be reduced following the legalization of the Communist Party of the Philippines and the abolition of Republic Act [RA] 1700, or the anti-subversion law.

The Armed Forces of the Philippines [AFP] chief also expects that the legalization of the CPP will greatly marginalize the strength of the New People's Army [NPA].

Approximately 70,000 CAFGU members would be laid off depending on the number of NPA rebels who continue to operate against the government. According to Abadia, since the CAFGU is the reservist arm of the AFP, any reduction in the number of CAFGU members would greatly depend on the number of active NPA rebels still operating in the country.

The AFP chief stated that the repeal of RA 1700 is a positive signal heralding peace in the country; however, the AFP is still prepared to handle any of the rebels who may reject the government's peace efforts.

Military To Continue Anti-Insurgency Operations

HK2509022892 Manila DWIZ Voice of the Filipino People's Radio in Tagalog 2200 GMT 24 Sep 92

[Text] Defense Secretary Renato De Villa has reiterated that the military has not yet ceased anti-insurgency operations. This is in view of the repeal of Republic Act 1770 or the Antisubversion Law.

According to De Villa, the rebels' armed struggle cannot be stopped easily even though the communist movement has been legalized. He said military operations would continue against rebels who, up until now, are still using violent means to attain their goals.

Military Rebels Confident in Unification Panel

HK2109094992 Manila MANILA BULLETIN in English 20 Sep 92 pp 1, 12

[Report by Aris R. Ilagan]

[Text] Leaders of the outlawed Rebolusyonaryong Alyansang Makabayan [Nationalist Revolutionary Alliance] (RAM) have expressed their confidence in the sincerity and capability of National Unification Commission (NUC) Chairman Haydee Yorac to come up with a feasible solution for the problems of military rebellion and communist insurgency in the country.

In an interview, a RAM officer said Yorac had established good rapport with several rebel officers even before President Ramos started his unification moves with communists and ultra-rightist elements.

Yorac visited detention centers for captured leaders of RAM and the Communist Party of the Philippines-New People's Army (CPP-NPA) in Fort Bonifacio, Makati, and Camp Crame and Camp Aguinaldo in Quezon City as part of informal consultations with rebel groups.

Meanwhile, Yorac asked Gen. Lisandro C. Abadia, Armed Forces chief of staff, to release RAM leaders without "sensationalizing" their release, consistent with the personal dignity of the persons involved.

At least 18 rebel military officers and five communist leaders have been released from detention in line with President Ramos' reconciliation moves.

While she blamed "red tape" among the obstacles in the processing of applications for release of rebel soldiers and communists, the NUC chairman asked Defense Secretary Renato S. De Villa and Abadia to speed the review of cases of detained RAM and CPP-NPA leaders.

Yorac also said that several church leaders have offered to provide emissaries of the National Democratic Front (NDF) with protection during consultations with government representatives.

"I do not understand why we should hold talks anywhere but in the Philippines," she said, referring to the call of CPP founder Jose Ma. Sison and NDF Vice Chairman Luis Jalandoni to hold peace negotiations abroad.

The RAM officer, who requested not to be identified, said that while President Ramos has shown his sincerity in solving the military and communist rebellion, "several of his men in the government have been making moves to derail the reconciliation efforts with their selfish motives."

He also deplored the use as a criteria of "least culpable offenders" for the release of detained rebels, saying that those already released from detention were top-ranking RAM and CPP-NPA leaders.

"If they (government) want to play it according to rules, then let's do it strictly by the book," he said.

He also complained that all police officers linked in the series of coup attempts, including Lt. Col. Vic Batac, Lt. Col. Rodolfo Tor, and Capt. Diosdado Valleroso, have been released to the custody of their superior officers and their cases were allegedly quashed before civilian and military courts "with the intervention of some influential personalities."

Muslim Rebels Urged To Join Talks

HK2509035392 Manila PHILIPPINE DAILY INQUIRER in English 25 Sep 92 p 6

[Text] The National Unification Commission (NUC) has sent feelers to the secessionist Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) to sit down for peace talks, NUC Chairman Haydee Yorac said yesterday.

Yorac, who was in Malacanang for a meeting with the President, said she was confident the commission could persuade Jeddah-based MNLF Chairman Nur Misuari to come home and participate in negotiations to bring peace to Mindanao.

"We're just establishing contacts to see the possibility of his (Misuari) coming back," Yorac told Palace reporters.

Yorac said the commission may recommend the issuance of a safe conduct pass to Misuari and his men during the start of the peace talks if they wanted.

With the establishment of contacts with military, communist and Muslim rebels, Yorac said the commission will start defining the amnesty package and the procedure on substantive issues for the peace process.

Yorac clarified that the NUC will not form a panel to negotiate with the rebels since it will be President Ramos who will determine the composition of the panel.

The NUC, she said, will submit its recommendations for a peace arrangement that will not only reflect the opinions of the different contending factions but also of the different sectors of the community.

"In other words, it is a community-based peace structure that does not only reflect the interests of the different parties," Yorac said.

Asked whether getting a community-based consensus on the peace talks could drag the peace process, Yorac said there was no need to follow a rigid timetable since the situation was still very fluid. The NUC was given a life of 90 days.

She said "events rush very quickly" so there was no need to talk about the venue first before the negotiations.

"I don't think they have raised the issue of peace," Yorac said. "We don't want to talk of the venue now because I think a venue presupposes that there is already negotiations. We are only paving the way to negotiations."

Taiwan Not To Use F-16s To Boost Spratlys Claim

HK2509050892 Quezon City MALAYA in English 25 Sep 92 p 2

[Report by Carlito Pablo]

[Text] The Taiwanese Government will not use the F-16 fighter jets it has bought from the United States to bolster its claim over the Spratlys islands, the Taipei Economic and Cultural Office in Manila said yesterday.

Liu Po-lun, head of the mission, said Taiwan intends to settle peacefully with other countries laying claim over the potentially oil-rich islands.

The islands are being claimed wholly or in part by Taiwan, China, the Philippines, Vietnam, Brunei, and Malaysia. Aside from the oil potential, the islands straddle strategic sea routes in the South China Sea.

Liu said the 150 F-16 planes which his government bought from the United States will be used for the defense of Taiwan. Taipei is also planning to acquire French Mirage jets.

Liu said Taiwan maintains troops in the largest island in the Spratlys called Tai-ping, or Island of Peace. The soldiers were stationed after World War II.

Liu said his government is willing to participate in dialog which will discuss joint activities in the Spratlys among claimants.

He said Taiwan supports the declaration issued last July by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations calling for a peaceful resolution of the dispute.

Foreign Secretary Roberto Romulo has said he does not see the arms buildup in Taiwan as a security threat to the Philippines.

He said the weapons acquisition will have no bearing on the Philippine claim in the Kalayaan group of islands off Palawan [that part of Spratlys claimed by the Philippines] where marines are garrisoned.

Liu said: "The Philippines and Taiwan maintain a very friendly relationship."

Taiwan participated in informal meetings convened by Indonesia to explore possibilities for joint cooperation. Activities eyed include weather monitoring, conservation of marine resources, navigation safety aids, and others.

Thailand

20 Burmese Rebel Soldiers Arrested at Border

BK2509030192 Bangkok BANGKOK POST in English 25 Sep 92 p 6

[Text] Tak—Twenty soldiers of the Karen National Union [KNU] were arrested at a checkpoint in Mae Ramat District yesterday with a quantity of war weapons. The arrest took place at about 11 P.M. when Border Patrol Police and administrative officials manning the Ban Ton Phueng checkpoint stopped a jeep for a routine search.

The 20 soldiers appeared to be KNU soldiers, armed with 14 G-2 and G-3 rifles and ammunition. Sgt Toe Naw, 40, who was in charge of the KNU soldiers, said he and other soldiers were on their way from Mae La Camp, the headquarters of the KNU's 7th Division opposite Tha Song Yang District, to reinforce the 101st KNU Special Battalion at Kawmoora Camp opposite Tak's Mae Sot District.

He said KNU reinforcements have been despatched to Kawmoora Camp via Thai territory since September 22 after learning that Burmese troops are now poised to attack KNU camps along the Thai-Burmese border.

Garment Exporters Skirting U.S. Quota Limits

BK2509033392 Bangkok BANGKOK POST in English 25 Sep 92 p 17

[Text] Unscrupulous Thai garment traders are using a new tactic—the Hong Kong Connection—to exceed quota limits on exports to the United States, according to an industry source. The Foreign Trade department has called on the Commercial Crime Division to bust the racket.

The traders are cooperating with some Hong Kong businessmen to produce fake export licences enabling garments sent to the colony to be shipped on to the United States. The group earlier produced fake documents to send the goods from Thailand directly but stopped this practice to avert prosecution by the Commerce Ministry. Using Hong Kong as a base for the underground trade makes detection more difficult, the source said.

"It was a terrible shock when we found the case because it is difficult for Thai officials to tackle it. The gang intends to operate outside the country to beat Thai laws."

The source said the group sends offers from Hong Kong "buyers" to its members in Thailand. False but credible documents accompany the garments to Hong Kong and later enable the cargo to pass through U.S. Customs. All payments are made between Hong Kong and the United States without any direct participation from anyone in Thailand.

The racket emerged after alleged widespread fraud involving garment export quota licences became public and Commerce Minister Amaret Sila-on vowed to act sternly against any exporters involved.

The trade department should speed up computerized checks on exports documents, the source said.

The tactic is working because of strong demand for export quotas among garment exporters, especially newcomers who have none.

A textile agreement between Thailand and the United States exempts some garments from quota controls, but many specific items deemed to adversely affect the American textile industry face limits.

The forging of export licences came to light when the United States' textiles clearance authority raised doubts about an unusual increase in category 337/338 cotton knit shirts imported from Thailand this year. After double-checking all documents, evidence emerged that 28 export documents had been faked covering more than 100,000-dozen items. The department claimed 77 exporters were suspected of producing these fake documents to hide the fact that they did not export their full quotas within the time set by the department. This failure carries penalties.

Department director-general Charae Chutharattanakun last week went to Washington DC for an urgent meeting with U.S. officials on ways to counter the illegal sales. They are trying to avoid penalizing legitimate exporters who may be unable to ship their export quotas this year if the U.S. slaps on an embargo or suspends imports from certain garment traders. Some garment exporters claim they did nothing illegal and blame mistakes in document checks.

Thai Garment Manufacturer Association representatives called on the department to ease its measures. The department agreed but exporters must certify that the have complied with the regulations and submit their evidence to the department within 45 days.

So far 12 exporters have proven they are not involved in any rackets, the source said.

Vietnam

Commentary on POW-MIA Issue, Trade Embargo

BK2509044492 Hanoi Voice of Vietnam in English 1000 GMT 23 Sep 92

[Station commentary]

[Text] This the second time within four months the U.S. Senate select committee organized hearings on the POW-MIA issue. Like in the previous hearings in June, this time many U.S. officials asserted that there are no firm evidence to support live sighting reports on American GIs since the end of the war.

According to the WASHINGTON POST, although many secret documents on the POW-MIA issue were presented at this hearing, the latest information failed to produce any new proofs of live American prisoners of war. As reported by REUTERS on Monday, James Schlesinger, former CIA director in the period between February and July 1973, said he did not know anything about U.S. prisoners being detained in Indochina.

Mr William Clark, assistant secretary of state, recently admitted that Vietnam has been active in resolving the problem of American reported missing in the war. He said the U.S. highly appreciates these efforts of Vietnam.

Yet, the U.S. Administration still hangs tough on its anti-Vietnam policy on the alleged pretext that the POW-MIA issue has not been settled. The U.S. President, Mr. Bush, has signed an order to extend the U.S. trade embargo against Vietnam.

The public in the U.S. and Vietnam both hold that this Washington move runs counter to the interests of both people and is not relevant to the current trend of our times.

Vo Van Kiet Reelected Prime Minister

BK2409101992 Hanoi Voice of Vietnam in English 1000 GMT 24 Sep 92

[Text] The first session of the Ninth National Assembly ended the fifth day of work on Thursday.

The session elected Madame Nguyen Thi Binh vice president of the state, Mr. Vo Van Kiet premier, Mr. Pham Hung president of the Supreme People's Court, and Mr. Le Thanh Dao head of the Supreme People's Inspectorate.

Speaking at the session after being elected as premier, Mr. Vo Van Kiet said: I am aware that this trust has not resulted for myself but for the party and state—that is, the confidence in the national renovation process which has obtained initial successes.

Premier Vo Van Kiet also expressed his and other government members' determination to bring into full play the gains already achieved and overcome difficulties to reach socioeconomic development targets and expand relations with friends in the world, strive to take our country onwards in the new situation.

Also in this session, the deputies discussed the bill on the organization of government.

Comments on Action Program

BK2409143592 Hanoi Voice of Vietnam Network in Vietnamese 1100 GMT 24 Sep 92

[Unidentified station correspondent's 24 September interview with Prime Minister Vo Van Kiet "following his reelection as prime minister by the National Assembly on the government's action program until the end of the year"—recorded]

[Text] [Correspondent] I would like to congratulate you, comrade, on your reelection by the National Assembly as prime minister. By the way, could you speak of the principal issues of the government's action program for the period until the end of the year?

[Kiet] At present, in the action program for the period until the end of the year, the most important thing is how to carry out in a really satisfactory fashion all those norms and objectives for the year 1992, that is, to maintain better stability than earlier this year.

[Correspondent] Can the replacement of a number of cabinet members this time create any impact on government activities?

[Kiet] The rearrangement and readjustment of the government is aimed chiefly at making the government activities more effective.

[Correspondent] Mr. Prime Minister: A painful issue for our public at present is corruption. What measures will you and the government take to deal with this?

[Kiet] At present, corruption is a painful issue for the entire party and society. Many countermeasures have been taken. In eradicating corruption, the government and responsible law enforcement organs should draw on experience in past anticorruption activities in order to link the renovation undertaking with anticorruption efforts and to reduce wasteful spending. They should carry out this task more resolutely and positively while the mass media should also do their utmost for this purpose. Generally speaking, the people should positively take part in anticorruption activities initiated by the government and responsible law enforcement organs.

[Correspondent] I wish you, Mr. Prime Minister, good health and satisfactory fulfillment of the mandate entrusted to you by the National Assembly.

Vo Van Kiet Biography

BK2409155092 Hanoi VNA in English 1410 GMT 24 Sep 92

[Text] Hanoi VNA Sept. 24—Following is a short biography of Vo Van Kiet who was re-elected prime minister

of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam at this morning plenary meeting of the Ninth National Assembly by a 98.48 percent vote.

Vo Van Kiet was born on November 23, 1922 into all-peasant family in Vinh Bong Province. He militated in the anti-imperialist youth movement and took part in the Nam Ky (Cochin-China) insurrection in 1940. After the Coneral insurrection in August 1945, for many years he led resistance organizations against French war of reconquest in many localities in the Mekong River delta.

After the signing of the Geneva agreements on Vietnam in 1954, Vo Van Kiet took part in leading the fight against the US aggressors and their Saigon puppet regime in the southwest region of South Vietnam and the Saigon-Gia Dinh zone.

After 1979, he was assigned to important posts in Ho Chi Minh City such as deputy secretary then secretary of the party committee and chairman of the people's committee.

From 1982 [?he] assumed the posts of chairman of the State Planning Commission, vice-chairman of the Council of Ministers and since August 1991 has been chairman of the Council of Ministers. In the latter post he helped to find out and experiment with a new model for economic construction in Vietnam, changing from the centralized bureaucratic planning mechanism to the market mechanism.

Vo Van Kiet was elected alternate member of the Communist Party of Vietnam Central Committee in 1960, full member of the party Central Committee in 1972, then alternate political bureau member in 1976. Since 1982, he has been a Politburo member of the party Central Committee.

VNA Profiles President Le Duc Anh

BK2409092792 Hanoi VNA in English 1526 GMT 23 Sep 92

[Text] Hanoi VNA Sept. 23—The Ninth National Assembly at its session this afternoon elected Mr. Le Duc Anh, deputy of Thua Thien-Hue Province, Politburo member of the Communist Party of Vietnam Central Committee, as president of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam.

Following in a short biography of the newly elected president:

Mr. Le Duc Anh was born in Truong Ha commune, Phu Vang district, Thua Thien-Hue Province on December 1st, 1920. He took part in revolution activities in 1937, and joined the Indochinese Communist Party in 1938.

From 1948-1954 Le Duc Anh was chief of staff of the 7th military zone, the 8th military zone, and then the Saigon-Cho Lon military zone, and deputy chief of staff from Nam Bo (South Vietnam proper).

1955-1962: He was deputy chief of the operation department, chief of the army personnel department under the general staff, and became colonel.

1963 : He was deputy chief of the general staff of the Vietnam People's Army [VPA], then chief of staff for South Vietnam.

1969 : Le Duc Anh was vice secretary of the party committee and commander of the 9th military zone, and deputy army commander of southern Vietnam, member of the party committee for the army in southern Vietnam. He became lieutenant general.

1975 : He was deputy commander of the Ho Chi Minh campaign.

In 1976 : Le Duc Anh became commander and political commissar of the 7th military zone, member of the central party committee for the VPA. Early 1980 he was promoted senior lieutenant general, and then appointed deputy minister of defence and commander of Vietnam voluntary army in Cambodia. In 1982 : He was appointed head of the Vietnamese experts mission to Cambodia. In 1984 he was promoted general. In December 1986 he was appointed minister of defence, and vice secretary of the Central Party Committee for the VPA.

At the 7th party congress in 1991 he was elected secretary of the Party Central Committee and first vice secretary of the Central Party Committee for the VPA.

He was deputy to the sixth (1976), and eighth (1987) National Assembly.

24 Sep National Assembly Proceedings Reported

BK2409135992 Hanoi Voice of Vietnam Network in Vietnamese 1100 GMT 24 Sep 92

[Report by station correspondent on 24 September proceedings of the Ninth National Assembly's first session at the Ba Dinh Conference Hall in Hanoi]

[Text] Dear friends, today the National Assembly worked at the conference hall on two major issues. It discussed Chapter I of the draft bill on the organization of the government, and elected the vice president of the state, prime minister of the government, chief justice of the Supreme People's Court, and chief of the Supreme People's Organ of Control.

In the morning proceedings the deputies listened to National Assembly Chairman Nong Duc Manh's compilation report on National Assembly deputy opinions on the list of candidates to the positions of state vice president, prime minister, chief justice of the Supreme People's Court, and chief of the Supreme People's Organ of Control. They voiced their support for National Assembly Chairman Nong Duc Manh and President Le Duc Anh on being elected to their new positions. Afterward, the deputies voted by secret ballot for the state vice president, the government prime minister, the

Supreme People's Court chief justice, and the chief of the Supreme People's Organ of Control.

In this afternoon's proceedings, the National Assembly continued to hold its plenary session under the direction of Chairman Nong Duc Manh and two vice chairman Nguyen Ha Phan and Dang Quan Thuy. The National Assembly listened to Comrade Ha Quang Du, chairman of the Vote Tabulation Committee, announce results of the voting as follows:

Comrade Nguyen Thi Binh was elected state vice president with 97.47 percent of the vote. Comrade Vo Van Kiet was elected prime minister with 98.48 percent of the vote. Comrade Pham Hung was elected chief justice of the Supreme People's Court with 87.34 percent of the vote. Comrade Le Thanh Dao was elected chief justice of the Supreme People's Organ of Control with 90.38 percent.

After announcing the results of the aforementioned positions, Prime Minister Vo Van Kiet thanked the National Assembly. He said:

[Begin Vo Van Kiet recording] Dear comrade leaders of party and state, dear National Assembly deputies, first of all, I honestly thank the National Assembly deputies for electing me to the position of prime minister of the government during the official term of the Ninth National Assembly.

I realize that this trust is not only in me but manifests the confidence of the National Assembly, as well as people from all walks of life, in the party and government. It is a belief in the victory of the renovation undertaking, which has been scoring initial achievements. [applause]

The task that the National Assembly entrusted to me in this position is very formidable, with no fewer difficulties. I promise to the country's National Assembly, people, and soldiers that I will continue to do my best to fulfill the duties the National Assembly and people have given me.

In this session the National Assembly will decide on the structure and members of the government. The government will present its planning in this term to the National Assembly. Together with Cabinet members, we will strive to maintain and develop achievements scored by our people, continue to overcome difficulties and shortcomings for a gradual and complete renewal of the administration mechanism, strengthen the leadership in implementing socioeconomic targets, and broaden relations with friends in the world to continue taking the country forward in the new situation. [applause]

I sincerely expect the assistance and cooperation of leading comrades of party organs, mass organizations, the Vietnam Fatherland Front, and the government, and the supervision of the National Assembly in performing my task. I would like to thank the National Assembly again. [applause] [end recording]

Dear friends, in an atmosphere of happiness and trust Prime Minister Vo Van Kiet shook hands and embraced Comrade General Secretary Do Muoi, President Le Duc Anh, Vo Chi Cong, and many leading comrades of the party and government attending the session of the National Assembly.

Assembly Issues Communique No. 3 on 24 Sep

BK2409153792 Hanoi Voice of Vietnam Network in Vietnamese 1430 GMT 24 Sep 92

[Communique No. 3 of the First Session of the Ninth National Assembly]

[Text] The National Assembly held a plenary session at the conference hall on 24 September under the direction of National Assembly Vice Chairman Nguyen Ha Phan.

In the morning the National Assembly debated Chapter I dealing with generalities of the draft law on the organization of the government. After that, National Assembly Chairman Nong Duc Manh reported on the views of various National Assembly delegations on candidates standing for election to various positions, namely the state vice president, the prime minister, the chief judge of the Supreme People's Court, and the chief procurator of the Supreme People's Organ of Control. The National Assembly decided on the list of candidates to these positions and conducted the election.

In the evening the National Assembly heard Election Committee Chairman Ha Quang Du report on the results of the election as follows:

1. State vice president: Mrs. Nguyen Thi Binh was elected state vice president with 97.47 percent of the total votes cast by National Assembly deputies.

2. Prime minister: Mr. Vo Van Kiet was elected prime minister with 98.48 percent of the total votes cast by National Assembly deputies.

3. Chief judge of the Supreme People's Court: Mr. Pham Hung was elected chief judge of the Supreme People's Court with 87.34 percent of the total votes cast by National Assembly deputies.

4. Chief procurator of the Supreme People's Organ of Control: Mr. Le Thanh Dao was elected chief procurator of the Supreme People's Organ of Control with 90.38 percent of the total votes cast by National Assembly deputies.

The prime minister delivered a speech thanking the National Assembly for his re-election.

Afterwards the National Assembly continued to debate Chapters I and II of the draft law on organization of the government.

Assembly Continues Plenary Session 25 Sep

BK2509024292 Hanoi Voice of Vietnam Network in Vietnamese 2300 GMT 24 Sep 92

[Text] Today, 25 September, the Ninth National Assembly continues its plenary session at the conference hall in Hanoi to elect the chairman and vice chairmen of the Nationalities Council, the chairmen and vice chairmen of various National Assembly Committees, the members of the Nationalities Council and of National Assembly Committees, and the members of the National Assembly's Secretariat.

Also in today's proceedings, the National Assembly continues its discussion on the draft law on government organization.

Morning Session Approves Namelists

BK2509070292 Hanoi Voice of Vietnam Network in Vietnamese 0500 GMT 25 Sep 92

[Text] Today, 25 September—the sixth work day of the Ninth National Assembly's first session—the National Assembly continued its plenary meeting at the conference hall in Hanoi. Comrade Nong Duc Manh, chairman of the National Assembly directed the meeting.

The National Assembly heard Dang Quan Thuy, vice chairman of the National Assembly introduce a manelist of candidates for members of the Nationalities Council, members of various National Assembly committees, and members of the National Assembly Secretariat. National Assembly deputies discussed and approved this namelist through voting.

After electing a committee to verify votes at the National Assembly, deputies voted by secret ballot to elect the chairman and vice chairmen of the Nationalities Council, the chairmen and vice chairmen of various National Assembly committees, the members of the Nationalities Council and National Assembly committees, and the members of the National Assembly Secretariat. Results of the voting will be announced at this afternoon's proceedings.

Also at this morning's proceedings, National Assembly deputies continued their debate on Chapter II of the draft law on government organization, which deals with the duties and power of the government. A total of 14 delegates expressed their views on this issue.

The National Assembly continues its work, this afternoon, at the conference hall in Hanoi.

Bill on Government Organization Presented 19 Sep

BK2309114392 Hanoi Voice of Vietnam Network in Vietnamese 0330 GMT 19 Sep 92

[Report by Nguyen Khanh, vice chairman of the Council of Ministers, on the draft bill on the organization of the government presented at the opening morning proceedings of the Ninth National Assembly's first session on 19 September—live]

[Text] Dear comrade general secretary, chairman of the Council of State, chairman of the National Assembly, chairman of the Council of Ministers, and National Assembly delegates,

On behalf of the Council of Ministers, I would like to present the National Assembly report on the draft bill on the organization of the Government of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam.

To implement the legislation program of the Eighth National Assembly, the Council of Ministers compiled a draft bill on the organization of the government to replace the Law on the Organization of the Council of Ministers promulgated on 4 July 1981.

From the beginning, the draft bill was prepared with the participation of many central government offices, including the Office of the National Assembly and the Council of State and the Internal Affairs Department of the party Central Committee. The draft bill was also discussed many times by the Council of Ministers. The Judiciary Committee of the Eighth National Assembly held two meetings in February and July 1992 to examine and offer views on the draft bill. The Council of State, in its meeting on 29 and 30 July 1992, contributed opinions before the draft was presented to the Ninth National Assembly.

After receiving opinions from the Council of State, the draft bill was studied and discussed by chairmen of the people's councils and people's committees from 53 provinces and cities in a meeting held in Hanoi on 10-12 August 1992.

The following is the report of the Council of Ministers on the two major subjects of the draft bill: the leading principles in formation of the draft bill, and the main issues of the content of the draft.

I. Leading Principles in Formation of the Draft Bill

The 1992 Constitution is the foundation for construction of principal laws on the organization of the government. The draft bill on the organization of the government is made in full awareness of fundamental regulations defined in the Constitution on the socialist government and our political and economic structure in the transitional period to socialism, and on the government system and principles of organization and activities of government offices, particularly the regulations on government in Chapter Eight of the 1992 Constitution.

The draft bill was constructed on the basis of the party's fundamental viewpoints, which are reflected in the resolutions of the Seventh National Party Congress on renovation of the government mechanism to enhance management efficiency and legal power. The center of the renovation focuses on the national administration network to build a socialist government of the people, by

the people, and for the people to meet the requirements of the renovation undertaking in our country.

The draft bill reflects and concretizes duties for building and improving the power of the socialist government, which is organized and works according to the principle of democratic centralism. The power of the government is vested in the National Assembly, with clear definition of responsibility between the National Assembly, government, Supreme People's Court, and Supreme People's Organ of Control.

The stipulations of the draft bill clarify the position of the government as an executive body of the National Assembly and as an utmost state administration organ. They also clarify the duty and power of the government, prime minister, and Cabinet members to develop the strength and intelligence of the government in deciding important issues within its authority; strengthen the role of the prime minister, who is the head of government; and increase the individual responsibility of every government member.

The draft bill was also formulated based on experiences drawn from more than 10 years of application of the 1981 Law on Organization of the Council of Ministers and recent practical activities of the Council of Ministers. The reasonable stipulations of the 1981 Law on the Organization of the Council of Ministers were inherited by this draft bill. The draft bill also draws better solutions for the organization of the government through practical activities of the government, particularly issues involving government authority, definition of individual and collective responsibility of government members, and assurance of government efficiency from the central to grassroots levels.

Many opinions from the Judiciary Committee of the Eighth National Assembly, chairmen of the people's councils and people's committees of 53 provinces and cities, and other central offices were perceived and reflected in chapters and articles of the draft bill. The draft bill also received views from the Council of State before it made its last adjustment on 7 September 1992.

II. Main Issues of the Content of the Draft Bill.

The draft bill consists of six chapters and 43 articles.

Chapter I: General Stipulations

There are five articles in chapter I dealing with fundamental issues relating to the position, duty, responsibility, composition, official term, principles, structure, and activities of the government. The stipulations in Chapter One are the basis for specified stipulations in the following chapters of the draft bill.

Article 1 deals with the position, power, and responsibility of the government. The content of this article is identical to Article 109 of the Constitution.

Article 2 stipulates the composition of the government; the procedure in electing the prime minister; and regulations for the appointment, termination, and discharge of members of the cabinet. This article contains the following key points:

—There are various types of ministers, namely, minister heading a ministry; minister heading a state commission—if the state commission system is still maintained; minister in charge of government affairs; and minister heading the office of the government.

—Regarding the state bank governor, given the current conditions in our country, state monetary management plays a very significant role while the position of the governor must be strengthened. Therefore, the draft law stipulates that the governor of the state bank is a member of the cabinet. In many countries taht apply the market economic system, the state bank governor is not a member of the cabinet.

—Regarding the procedure in electing the prime minister and the regulations in appointing, terminating, and discharging members of the cabinet, Article 74 of the Law on Organization of the National Assembly stipulates: the National Assembly shall elect a prime minister from among the national assembly deputies at the recommendation of the president of the state. The National Assembly shall approve the prime minister's recommendation on the appointment of deputy prime ministers, ministers, and other members of the government, made in the form of a namelist specifying names and positions.

Some suggested that Chapter I of this draft law should specify the number and list of ministries and agencies equivalent to ministry level. We think that it is not proper to specify the number of ministries because the structure of the government—as presented at the first session of the Ninth National Assembly—though carefully formulated, was designed to suit the immediate situation. In the present stage, while we strive to improve economic management, we have to gradually renovate and perfect the political system. As a result, amendments to the organization of ministries and agencies equivalent to ministry level to suit the socioeconomic situation and to meet the requirements of the new economic mechanism are necessary at various stages—each stage may last a few years or at mid-term of the government. For this reason, if we fix the number of ministries and agencies equivalent to ministry level in the law, then we have to amend the law when we want to amend the organization of ministries, thus creating inconvenience for sectors concerned.

Article 3 stipulates the term of the government. This article is the text of article 113 of the Constitution.

Article 4 refers to Article 6 of the Constitution which says: The National Assembly, the People's Councils, and other state agencies are all organized and operating in accordance with the principle of democratic centralization. Efforts must be made to concretize this principle to

suit the organization and activities of the government by clearly defining the responsibility and power of the government, the prime minister, and each member of the cabinet. Stipulations in article 4 will serve as a basis for other articles in the following chapters, especially stipulations related to issues to be discussed by the goverment, responsibility of the prime minister and ministers, and voting system in government meetings

Article 5 deals with method to manage state affairs, implementation of the government's tasks and power with emphasis on the role of the state law and responsibility of the government in coordination with the Vietnam Fatherland Front and other mass organizations.

Chapter II: Duties and powers of the Government.

Chapter II is composed of 11 articles, defining the duties and powers of the government. After refering to all stipulations of article 112 of the Constitution on duties and power of the government, article 6 of Chapter II concretizes the duties and power of the government on various concrete domains.

The arrangement of stipulations in this chapter was made in accordance with the method used in 1981 while amendement was applied to suit the duties of the government in the new situation. However, this arrangement was different from the arrangement of government agencies. Following are notable aspects of chapter two:

Item 3 of Article 14 [as heard] stipulates that the government shall decide on the establishment, merging, and abolition of agencies attached to the government. According to the Constitution, the government is composed of ministries, agencies equivalent to ministry level, and other organizations such as general departments, committees, and departments attached to the government.

The Constitution stipulated that the National Assembly shall decide on the establishment or abolition of ministries and agencies equivalent to ministry level. This draft law specifies that the government shall decide on setting up of organizations attached to the government. This stipulation is clear and is in line with the Constitution.

Item 4 of Article 14 asserts the government's duties in uniformly managing personnel working at government agencies. This is essential because it will help the government to effectively carry out its responsibility. Various policies and systems governing state personnel must be formualted in a uniform fashion. These include the classification of state personnel at various echelons, the compensation plans, the working system, annual leave and retirement system, and insurance and incentive systems. Speaking about management of state personnel, it does not mean that we have to apply direct management to civil servants at certain units.

Item 1 of Article 15 [as heard], which concretizes item 1 of Article 112 of the Constitution, stipulates that the government directs and supervises the people's councils in implementing all the documents of state organs at higher levels.

It should be understood that documents of state organs at higher levels are the Constitution, laws, resolutions of the National Assembly, decrees and resolutions of the National Assembly Standing Committee, orders and decisions of the president of the state, resolutions and decrees of the government, and decisions and directives of the prime minister. This stipulation is consistent with and does not overlap the responsibilities of the National Assembly Standing Committee, which involve supervising and directing the activities of the people's councils.

Chapter III: The Prime Minister of the Government

There are three articles in Chapter III that involve determining the position and responsibility of the prime minister, who heads the government, and direct and manage his activities, specifically stipulating the duties and powers of the prime minister.

Following are matters in Chapter III to which attention should be paid:

—Item 4 of Article 18 stipulates that the prime minister shall set up permanent or provisional councils and committees to assist him in studying, directing, and jointly solving important issues among the sectors concerned. These councils and committees do not have the functions, duties, and powers of a ministry or an organ in a ministry. They are merely organizations that act in consultation with the prime minister.

Actual activities of the Council of Ministers testify to the necessity and efficiency of efforts to use and broaden the knowledge and wisdom of specialists and scientists to help resolve important short-term problems or coordinate actions among the sectors concerned in giving advice to the prime minister.

Chapter IV: Ministries and Ministers

There are 10 articles in Chapter IV. Under these articles, ministers are members of the government and have the responsibility to oversee the management of state affairs falling under their charge. They are responsible to the prime minister and the National Assembly for the way they discharge their duties to manage state affairs.

In keeping with this spirit, the draft bill contains 11 clauses under article 22 to concretize a minister's rights and duties, including the proper way he should interact with other ministers, as well as with people's councils or people's committees.

The following are issues of signficance in Chapter IV:

—Regarding the title of this chapter, as mentioned under Article 2 of the draft bill, besides the term minister, Chapter IV also mentions the terms state inspector general and governor of the state bank. Due to the fact that

ministers are responsible for most of the government, the title of Chapter IV is Ministries and Ministers.

—Regarding Article 20, definition of the term ministry as an organ of the government is consistent with existing regulations governing a ministry's functions. Under a government decree dated 1961, a ministry is defined as an organ of the Government Council. The scope of a ministry's state management as mentioned under Article 20 is well-defined and helps clarify a minister's duty to manage state affairs falling under his ministry's charge.

—Regarding Articles 24, 25, and 26, in order to ensure that the management of state affairs is carried out uniformly from the central down to local levels and to help clearly define a minister's rights and duties, articles 24, 25, and 26 of the draft bill clearly stipulate that a minister is entitled to the right to oversee the enforcement of legal documents of his ministry or of the state as a whole by other ministers and people's councils or people's committees concerned. These regulations define different kinds of action to be taken under different circumstances. For example, they include a minister's right to propose to other ministers and to the prime minister or make his own decision to suspend the implementation of legal documents deemed to be at variance with state law or government decisions.

In this connection, Article 24 clearly says: It is a minister's duty to direct and oversee the implementation of related tasks falling under his ministry's charge by other ministries, organs at the ministerial level, or government agencies. Based on this regulation, the minister of finance, for example, has the responsibility and power to direct and oversee the implementation of financial tasks by state agencies, as stipulated by state financial regulations. Article 25 says: A minister has the right to propose to the prime minister to suspend the implementation of decisions adopted by provincial or city people's councils directly subordinate to the central government, but deemed to be at variance with legal documents adopted by his ministry or by the state as a whole. Article 26 defines a minister's relations with people's committees.

In order to ensure the effect of state management over all sectors and areas of activity concerned, a minister must be granted appropriate rights, including the right to suspend the implementation of regulations adopted by people's committees and chairmen of provincial or city people's committees directly subordinate to the central government but deemed to be at variance with state legal documents governing the areas of activity falling under his ministry's charge. If a minister is deprived of this right, then it will be difficult to ensure the efficiency of state management or guarantee strict enforcement of state rules and regulations, and henceforth it will be impractical to hold a minister responsible for the operations of all sectors and areas of activity falling under his ministry's charge. Article 26, however, stipulates that a minister must be accountable for his decision to suspend a certain action.

There are some government agencies responsible for the management of different areas, but heads of these agencies are not Cabinet members. Therefore, Article 29 stipulates that heads of these agencies be entrusted with duties and authority specified in Articles 20 and 22 of the draft bill.

Chapter V: Working Regulations of the Government

Chapter V has 12 articles specifying the working regulations of the government. According to this chapter, the government is to issue its detailed working regulations. Following are the major issues covered in Chapter V:

Based on stipulations in article four of this draft bill on the principle of democratic centralism in the organization and activities of the government, Article 30 specifies that the government is performing its work under the guidelines of a combination of collective responsibility and Cabinet authority, involving the individual responsibility and authority of the prime minister and each Cabinet member.

Article 31 requests the prime minister to hold extraordinary Cabinet meetings at the request of at least one third of the Cabinet's members. It is a new stipulation and an important concretization of the government's working regulations to ensure the collectivity of government activities.

Article 115 of the Constitution stipulates that important issues under the authority of the government must be collectively discussed and decided by the majority. Article 35 defines issues that must be collectively discussed and voted on by the government. There are some issues that can be decided by the government and some issues that must be discussed and passed before being presenting to the National Assembly for approval.

Article 36 is about the voting method of Cabinet meetings. Decisions must be passed by more than half of Cabinet members. This article also specifies that in case there is an equal number of pro and con votes on a issue, the side supported by the prime minister wins. This stipulation is both to guarantee the collectivity of government activities and heighten the role and responsibility of the prime minister, head of the government.

Article 38 stipulates that the prime minister must assign a deputy prime minister to perform regular liaison between the government, the National Assembly, and committees of the National Assembly. This article is to assure good relations between the government, National Assembly, and National Assembly organs.

Article 41 defines that the government office is the headquarters of the government and prime minister. It also stipulates that the head of this office is minister of the government office. The duty, authority, organization

structure, and activities of the government office will be specified by the government.

Chapter VI. Implementation Clause

Chapter VI includes two articles specifying the responsibility of the government, detailed stipulations for implementation of this law, and the effect of this law in replacing the Law on the Organization of the Council of Ministers of 4 July 1981.

The Council of Ministers solemnly presents this draft bill on the organization of the government to the National Assembly for examination and approval. Thank you, all National Assembly deputies. [applause]

Papua New Guinea

Wingti Proposes Treaty With Solomon Islands

BK2309062292 Melbourne Radio Australia in English 0500 GMT 23 Sep 92

[Text] Papua New Guinea [PNG] prime minister, Paias Wingti, has included a proposal for a treaty between his country and Solomon Islands in a formal response to a Solomons protest note about a PNG commando raid earlier this month in which two Solomon islanders died.

The PNG National Broadcasting Commission said that in his message to Solomons prime minister, Solomon Mamaloni, Mr. Wingti said he wanted a formal treaty to be concluded which gave proper recognition to existing bilateral understandings and arrangements.

Mr. Wingti asked that Mr. Mamaloni endorsed the proposal so that negotiations could begin.

Radio Australia's correspondent in Honiara said that Solomons cabinet has been meeting to discuss the situation.

Meanwhile, Solomons radio said Mr. Mamaloni remains unhappy over the actions of the Australian defense attache in Honiara despite an explanation from the Australian Government on the presence of the attache near the border with PNG on the eve of the commando raid.

Mr. Mamaloni claimed that Commander Keith Eglan had failed to inform the correct Solomon Islands authorities of his intention to make a flying visit to the border area, although the Australian Foreign Affairs Department said proper notice on the visit was given to Solomons police.

Solomon Islands

Abducted Man Claims Statements Made at Gunpoint

BK2509073492 Melbourne Radio Australia in English 0500 GMT 25 Sep 92

[Text] A Solomon Islander kidnapped by Papua New Guinea [PNG] soldiers during the raid on the Shortland Islands in the Solomons territory two weeks ago says he was forced at gunpoint to make certain statements.

Mr. Francis Baiyaruro, who was held capttive for six days, said he was forced to say that Solomon Islands was helping the Bougainville Revolutionary Army [BRA] in spite of the Solomons people not wanting the BRA in their country.

He said the statements were recorded and released on radio in Rabaul. Mr. Baiyaruro also alleges that he was kept blindfolded for three days. Mr. Baiyaruro lost his pregnant wife and brother-in-law during the cross-border raid on 14 September and his three-year old daughter is still recovering in hospital from gunshot wounds sustained in the attack.

Vanuatu

Recognition of Taiwan Said Limited to Trade

BK2509060492 Hong Kong AFP in English 0534 GMT 25 Sep 92

[Text] Port Vila, Sept 25 (AFP)—Recognition of Taiwan by the Pacific island nation of Vanuatu extends to trade only, the prime minister's office here said on Friday.

In Taipei on Thursday, Taiwan's Foreign Minister Fu Chien said the two countries had signed a communique "to recognise each other officially immediately" as a first step towards establishing full diplomatic relations.

The announcement coincided with a visit by a seven-member delegation from Beijing led by Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Wang Wendong, who arrived here Thursday.

A spokesman for Prime Minister Maxime Carlot told AFP that recognition of Taiwan would not affect Vanuatu's good relations with Beijing.

Carlot discussed the announcement from Taipei with the Beijing delegation here on Friday, the spokesman said, and Wang is understood to have replied that his goverment did not object to trade links between Vanuatu and Taiwan.

Officials said the visit by the Chinese could lead to the signing of a memorandum of understanding on a five-year loan of about 400 million vatu (3.6 million U.S. dollars). The loan would be repayable by Vanuatu between 2000 and 2012.

Carlot told the Chinese officials that Vanuatu needs markets for its products and was considering Taiwan as a possible opening, the spokesman said.

State-run Radio Vanuatu relayed a report from Radio Australia early Friday saying that Vanuatu had officially recognized Taiwan.

A Foreign Ministry spokesman here said the government had merely endorsed a decision of the Council of Ministers, or cabinet, dated September 3, 1992 that Vanuatu engage in trade relations with Taipei.

Foreign Minister Serge Vohor is currently in Taipei, and is due to return to Vanuatu on Saturday.

A Foreign Ministry official told AFP that he had spoken to Vohor in person by telephone, and had received no indication that official mutual recognition would be signed.

This is a U.S. Government publication. Its contents in no way represent the policies, views, or attitudes of the U.S. Government. Users of this publication may cite FBIS or JPRS provided they do so in a manner clearly identifying them as the secondary source.

Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) and Joint Publications Research Service (JPRS) publications contain political, military, economic, environmental, and sociological news, commentary, and other information, as well as scientific and technical data and reports. All information has been obtained from foreign radio and television broadcasts, news agency transmissions, newspapers, books, and periodicals. Items generally are processed from the first or best available sources. It should not be inferred that they have been disseminated only in the medium, in the language, or to the area indicated. Items from foreign language sources are translated; those from English-language sources are transcribed. Except for excluding certain diacritics, FBIS renders personal names and place-names in accordance with the romanization systems approved for U.S. Government publications by the U.S. Board of Geographic Names.

Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets [ ] are supplied by FBIS/JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] or [Excerpts] in the first line of each item indicate how the information was processed from the original. Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a question mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear from the original source but have been supplied as appropriate to the context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by the source. Passages in boldface or italics are as published.

SUBSCRIPTION/PROCUREMENT INFORMATION

The FBIS DAILY REPORT contains current news and information and is published Monday through Friday in eight volumes: China, East Europe, Central Eurasia, East Asia, Near East & South Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America, and West Europe. Supplements to the DAILY REPORTs may also be available periodically and will be distributed to regular DAILY REPORT subscribers. JPRS publications, which include approximately 50 regional, worldwide, and topical reports, generally contain less time-sensitive information and are published periodically.

Current DAILY REPORTs and JPRS publications are listed in *Government Reports Announcements* issued semimonthly by the National Technical Information Service (NTIS), 5285 Port Royal Road, Springfield, Virginia 22161 and the *Monthly Catalog of U.S. Government Publications* issued by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

The public may subscribe to either hardcover or microfiche versions of the DAILY REPORTs and JPRS publications through NTIS at the above address or by calling (703) 487-4630. Subscription rates will be provided by NTIS upon request. Subscriptions are available outside the United States from NTIS or appointed foreign dealers. New subscribers should expect a 30-day delay in receipt of the first issue.

U.S. Government offices may obtain subscriptions to the DAILY REPORTs or JPRS publications (hardcover or microfiche) at no charge through their sponsoring organizations. For additional information or assistance, call FBIS, (202) 338-6735,or write to P.O. Box 2604, Washington, D.C. 20013. Department of Defense consumers are required to submit requests through appropriate command validation channels to DIA, RTS-2C, Washington, D.C. 20301. (Telephone: (202) 373-3771, Autovon: 243-3771.)

Back issues or single copies of the DAILY REPORTs and JPRS publications are not available. Both the DAILY REPORTs and the JPRS publications are on file for public reference at the Library of Congress and at many Federal Depository Libraries. Reference copies may also be seen at many public and university libraries throughout the United States.